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THE ISTANBUL CONVENTION’S EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS IN 
THE LIGHT OF LAWS ON SELF-DEFENCE AND MITIGATING 
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
By Alexandra Molitorisová*  and Ciarán Burke** 
ABSTRACT 
The article argues that the Council of Europe Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic 
Violence (Istanbul Convention), a comprehensive international treaty, 
may necessitate deep changes in its Parties’ domestic legal regimes, 
including reconceptualising laws on circumstances excluding or 
mitigating criminal responsibility and related evidentiary issues in 
domestic violence cases. The article first presents the theoretical 
underpinnings of a gendered understanding of violence and criminal 
laws. It then proceeds to present different approaches to law reform 
that have contemplated gendered laws on circumstances that exclude 
criminal responsibility, mostly in the context of homicides committed 
by battered women. Traditional approaches to law reform 
demonstrate how a gendered reconsideration of a single legal concept 
requires reconsideration of all legal principles governing the structure 
of that concept and causes a cascade effect. This, in turn, requires 
specific evidentiary considerations, including the context in which a 
crime is perpetrated, namely the dynamics of abusive partner 
relationships, social framework evidence, and the ‘demystification’ of 
violence against women. The article suggests that the Istanbul 
Convention’s emphasis on investigation and evidence and the 
promotion of a “gendered understanding of violence” may potentially 
open the question of criminal responsibility of female offenders by 
elevating gendered rules of evidence to gendered criminal law 
provisions (in a reverse cascade effect). 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (the 
Convention) was adopted on 11 May 2011 and came into effect on 1 
August 2014. The Convention will impact both common law countries 
(Ireland and the UK) and continental jurisdictions within the Council 
of Europe (CoE). As of April 2020, thirty-four countries have ratified 
the Convention.1 
The Convention will necessitate many structural as well as 
technical legal changes in the domestic criminal laws of States Parties 
 
1 The Convention is semi-open, meaning that States outside of the CoE system may 
accede to the Convention. 
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to the Convention2, and aims to engender a shift in thinking with 
regard to criminal law and domestic violence legislation.3 Given its 
gender-oriented philosophy, it is conceivable that some of these 
changes will involve rather dramatic reconsideration of generally 
applicable provisions concerning offences against bodily and mental 
integrity.4 The Convention combines general criminal law provisions, 
such as on statutes of limitation and sanctioning, with procedural and 
substantive provisions. The latter prescribe that Parties take necessary 
legislative or other measures to ensure that the intentional commission 
of certain acts, such as of sexual violence, including rape, and of acts 
which seriously impairing a person’s psychological integrity through 
coercion or threats, are criminalised.5 The Convention positions itself 
as a rights-based, victim-centred and gender-sensitive legal 
instrument.6 This, above all, entails that victim protection is viewed 
via a gendered prism: the Convention recognises that women are at 
greater risk of gender-based violence and are disproportionately 
affected by domestic violence.7 Its object and purpose is to protect 
women against all forms of violence and to design a comprehensive 
framework of policies and measures for the protection of and 
assistance to all victims of violence against women and domestic 
 
2 See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 210, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://
www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/210/signatures (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2021). 
3 See Ronagh McQuigg, Domestic Violence: Applying a Human Rights Discourse, in 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON PROTECTION, 
PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION 15-35 (Sarah Hilder & Vanessa Bettinson eds., 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
4 See Minni Leskinen, The Istanbul Convention on Sexual Offenses: A Duty to Reform 
the Wording of National Law or the Way We Think?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: EUROPE AND THE ISTANBUL CONVENTION 133-156 
(Johanna Niemi, Lourdes Peroni & Vladislava Stoyanova, eds., Routledge, 2020). 
5 Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against 
Women and Domestic Violence art. 32-40, opened for signature May 11, 2011, 
C.E.T.S. No. 210, https://rm.coe.int/168008482e [hereinafter Convention]. 
6 See WAVE Fact Sheet Istanbul Convention, WAVE NETWORK & EUROPEAN INFO 
CENTRE AGAINST VIOLENCE (Jan. 2016), http://fileserver.wave-network.org/research
reports/2016_WAVEFactSheetIC.pdf. 
7 Convention, supra note 5, at preamble. 
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violence.8 The stated objective affects all obligations under the 
Convention. 
This article discusses the changes in national criminal laws of 
States Parties that may be required in order to align them with the 
Convention. What adjustments does the “gendered understanding of 
violence” entail for domestic criminal law?9 
METHODOLOGY 
This article engages with national laws from diverse 
jurisdictions, but should not be considered as a comparative study. 
Jurisdictions treated include several non-Parties to the Convention, 
since violence against women is a world-wide problem. However, 
amongst the States Parties, this article devotes particular attention to 
France and Germany as two of the three largest jurisdictions, that are 
signatories of the Convention.10 The purpose of this approach is to 
demonstrate the variability in the legal status quo, which will be 
juxtaposed with certain Convention requirements. Again, this article 
does not attempt to make conclusions concerning the selected 
jurisdictions’ compliance with the Convention. Rather, it represents an 
– incomplete – mapping of the extent of a gendered understanding of 
violence in national laws. It is, of course, beyond the scope of a single 
article to comprehensively cover all possible areas of a legal order 
shaped by a gendered understanding of violence. We therefore 
focused upon one extreme case – that of a battered woman 
experiencing domestic violence and killing her abusive partner in 
alleged self-defence. Examining responses of national laws in this 
extreme case works as a litmus test concerning the gendered approach 
to criminal laws dealing with violence against women. It is possible to 
consider this test as the ultimate test of compliance with the “spirit” of 
the Convention. 
The article proceeds in the following manner: First, it focuses 
on providing a general theoretical meaning to the notion of “gendered 
understanding of violence.” Examples are predominantly drawn from 
 
8 Convention, supra note 5, at art. 1(1)(c). 
9 Id. at art. 49(2). 
10 Turkey was the second largest, however, in March 2021, it announced withdrawal 
from the Convention. 
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French and German law, the Convention, the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (ECtHR) case law, and the literature in the area of 
criminal law and gendered law reform. This part highlights the conflict 
between the Convention’s provisions, which states that it should be 
applied to male as well as female victims of domestic violence, and its 
promotion of a gendered understanding of violence. Articles 12 and 16 
of the Convention, in particular, exemplify this clash. Since this conflict 
is readily apparent even at the level of a prima facie reading of the 
Convention, we endeavoured to inquire whether it is also present at a 
deeper level. Academic literature reveals that the clash between a 
gendered understanding of violence and a “de-gendered” approach is 
driven by a feminist critique of laws that capture the “male view” of 
the world and that are regarded as unjust.11 In particular, self-defence 
laws attract criticism.12 In this critique, the case of a killing committed 
by a battered woman serves as a powerful example of how these laws 
operate in extreme circumstances.13 The proposition made in this 
article is that, although the Convention does not specifically regulate 
the laws of self-defence, it can have an indirect impact on how they 
operate, since the Convention contains an entire chapter covering the 
investigation and prosecution of violence against women and 
domestic violence, which is becoming a rich source of evidentiary rules 
and practices. 
The article identifies certain “evidentiary requirements” as an 
element of the gendered understanding of violence that mandate or 
encourage the use of specific evidence in domestic violence cases, as 
well as, potentially, in other cases of violence against women. These 
requirements are not explicitly prescribed by Convention’s text; 
however, they are found in the Explanatory Report accompanying the 
Convention, and may be inferred from the fact that the Convention 
 
11 See Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 254, 
279-302 (1992); See also Joanne Conaghan, Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical 
Project in Law, 27 J. OF L. & SOC’Y 351 (2000). 
12 See Carol Smart, WOMEN, CRIME AND CRIMINOLOGY: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE, at 27-
53 (Routledge, 2013). See also Danielle Tyson, SEX, CULPABILITY AND THE DEFENCE 
OF PROVOCATION, at 19-56 (Routledge, 2013). 
13 See generally Wendy Chan, A Feminist Critique of Self-Defense and Provocation 
in Battered Women’s Cases in England and Wales, 6 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 39-65 
(1994); See generally Katherine O’Donovan, Defences for Battered Women Who Kill, 
18 J. OF L. & SOC’Y 219-40 (1991). 
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represents a complex legal regulation for combatting violence against 
women and domestic violence.14 They may be also inferred from the 
social scientific evidence on the basis of which the Convention was 
drafted.15 In addition, such requirements may be found in the 
documents accompanying the implementation of the Convention.16 It 
is noted that the Convention should not be considered in isolation, and 
that, in particular in the CoE system, the rulings of the ECtHR must be 
considered.17 At this point, a further original contribution to the 
current scholarship is made, because no other research has addressed 
the question of the investigation of domestic violence as a distinct 
category of violence against women in the ECtHR case-law. The 
argument is then advanced that the Convention represents a more 
advanced framework than that of the ECHR in terms of a gendered 
perspective on investigation and evidence. 
The next step in our analysis was to demonstrate that 
evidentiary rules and practices stemming from the Convention have a 
more far-reaching impact than is necessarily visible in the day-to-day 
work of the police and the prosecution. We hypothesised that the 
impact can be sensed in questioning certain substantive criminal laws, 
and in particular those that concern self-defence or other defences to 
criminal responsibility of battered women. To prove our hypothesis 
concerning the ripple effects of the evidentiary requirements, we 
examined jurisdictions in which discussions about these effects have 
been taking place for a long time, albeit in the opposite direction, 
namely starting from considering changes to substantive rules to 
considering changes to evidentiary rules. Since the 1950s, common law 
jurisdictions have institutionalised a particular process of reforming 
 
14 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on 
preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence ¶¶ 191-192, 
¶¶ 277-278 (2011). 
15 See Ad Hoc Committee on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women 
and Domestic Violence [CAHVIO], Interim Report, at 13-17, CAHVIO 4 FIN (May 
27, 2009). 
16 See infra, at p. 13-17. 
17 See Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom et al., COURTING GENDER JUSTICE: RUSSIA, TURKEY, 
AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 171 (Oxford University Press, 2019). 
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laws by establishing law reform commissions18 These commissions are 
expert bodies which issue recommendations concerning law reform, 
to which they arrive via a particular method, namely reviewing how 
laws operate in practice, receiving submissions from professionals as 
well as the public, and conducting comparative analysis as well as a 
literature review.19 The question of battered woman syndrome and the 
laws governing self-defence has represented a hot topic amongst such 
commissions. At least in Australia, a veritable smörgåsbord of 
approaches to common law defences of self-defence and provocation 
has been created following recommendations from law reform bodies 
over the last 20 years.20 We examined every common law jurisdiction 
with an established law reform commission, but considered only those 
that published a final report with recommendations to the government 
concerning the use of self-defence by victims of long-term domestic 
abuse, either as a part of a broader review of defences, a review of the 
laws of homicide, a legal response to domestic violence, or a review of 
the laws of evidence. This analysis was undertaken in order to 
demonstrate a series of logical steps that take place between the 
external drive for law reform (social scientific evidence), the 
substantive law reform (elements of self-defence or other defences), 
and the consequences of the change in substantive laws (new 
evidentiary requirements). A variety of approaches and outcomes 
were evident. However, throughout this variety of approaches, we 
believe that we observed a universal method of thinking about 
reforms, the objective of which is to “gender” criminal laws and their 
operation. 
This leads us to the final part of the article in which we 
endeavoured to mimic the same method of thinking about law reform 
 
18 See Neil Rees, Chairperson of the Victorian Law Reform Commission, Speaker at 
the Australasian Law Reform Agencies Conference 2008: The Birth and Rebirth of 
Law Reform Agencies (Sept. 10-12, 2008). 
19 See Ciarán Burke & Ray Byrne, CASE STUDIES IN LEGAL RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGIES: REFLECTIONS ON THEORY AND PRACTICE (Laura Cahillane & 
Jennifer Schweppe eds., 2019). 
20 See Julie Stubbs, HOMICIDE, GENDER AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE, at ch. 2 (Kate Fitz-Gibbon & Sandra Walklate eds., 2016); See also 
Thomas Crofts & Danielle Tyson, Homicide Law Reform in Australia: Improving 
Access to Defences for Women Who Kill Their Abusers, 39 MONASH UNIV. L. REV., 
864-893 (2014). 
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prompted by a gendered understanding in the context of the 
Convention. We considered in detail the laws of homicide of France 
and Germany. The article argues that the consequences of a gendered 
understanding of violence are predominantly to be found in opening 
the question of criminal responsibility of female offenders by elevating 
gendered rules of evidence to gendered criminal law provisions. 
THE CONVENTION’S GENDERED UNDERSTANDING OF VIOLENCE 
The Convention prescribes in Article 18(2), relating to general 
obligations, that Parties shall have regard to a gendered understanding 
of violence against women and domestic violence in taking the 
necessary legislative and other measures to protect all victims from 
any further acts of violence covered by the scope of the Convention. 
What exactly the Convention means by a “gendered understanding” 
must be located elsewhere in the Convention, as well as inferred from 
its general tenor. The Convention is predicated upon the 
understanding that: (i) violence against women is a manifestation of 
historically unequal power relations between women and men; (ii) 
violence against women as a social mechanism of a structural nature 
forces women into a subordinate position; and that (iii) domestic 
violence affects women disproportionately.21 Having regard to the 
ideological underpinnings of the Convention, it must, however, be 
possible to understand the practical consequences of the prescribed 
gendered approach to violence in criminal justice systems. 
Theoretically, a gendered understanding of offences may 
reflect itself in various considerations: first by differentiating (i.e. 
explicitly legislating for) violent offences specifically aimed against 
women from general violent offences against bodily and mental 
integrity. This approach may be driven by three rationales: (i) by 
recognising a special (different) value of women’s lives and bodily and 
physical integrity as compared to those of men; (ii) by recognising a 
statistically important representation of a particular gender in the 
 
21 Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating 
violence against women and domestic violence, at 1-2, No.210 (2011). 
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victim population22 or the offender population;23 or (iii) by recognising 
the motive of the perpetrator, as a stand-alone element of the criminal 
offence.24 The final rationale proposes that a perpetrator may be 
charged with a relevant offence if a violent act was directed against 
women “because they are women, that is, because of socially 
constructed roles, behaviours, activities and attributes that a given 
society considers appropriate for women.”25 Therefore, in the most 
explicit fashion, the gendered understanding of violence may be 
located in the formulation of the offences covered by the Convention. 
Under the Convention, it is not sufficient to prosecute female genital 
mutilation as a form of bodily harm (Körperverletzung26 or des atteintes 
volontaires à l’intégrité de la personne27) or forced marriage as coercion 
(Nötigung28).29 Gendered offences are already enumerated in several 
 
22 It is difficult to argue that the offence of bodily injury (or physical violence, using 
the Convention’s terms) is a gendered offence, however, if a legislator differentiates 
domestic violence as a special type of physical violence, then the recorded statistics 
of such crime shows that victims and perpetrators are divided according to the gender 
line. According to Walby and Towers, when harm as well as act is included, the gender 
asymmetry of domestic violence becomes visible. See Sylvia Walby and Jude Towers, 
Measuring Violence to End Violence: Mainstreaming Gender, 1 JOURNAL OF GENDER-
BASED VIOLENCE 1, 11 (2017). See also Sylvia Walby and Jude Towers, Untangling 
the Concept of Coercive Control: Theorizing Domestic Violent Crime, 18 
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1, 20 (2018) (arguing that domestic violence is 
gender asymmetrical at all levels of seriousness and frequency). 
23 See Darrell Steffensmeier & Emilie Allan, Gender and Crime: Toward a Gendered 
Theory of Female Offending, 22 ANN. REV. OF SOCIO., 459 (1996). It is also possible 
to consider crimes such as infanticide committed by a mother to be gendered in this 
way. 
24 See also Karen Boyle, What’s in the Name? Theorising the Inter-relationships of 
Gender and Violence, 20 FEMINIST THEORY 1, 1 (2018). 
25 Per the definition of the Convention Article 3(c), if gender is conceived as a motive, 
its definition per the Convention bears utmost significance. See Council of Europe 
Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic 
Violence, Council of Eur., art. 3(c) (2011). 
26 STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] [PENAL CODE], § 223, translation at https://
www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html (Ger.). 
27 CODE PENAL [C. PEN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 221-1 – 221-11-1 (Fr.). 
28 Id. at § 240. 
29 Domestic legislation may also implement the Convention’s explicit formulation of 
offenses differently. For example, a new criminal offense of coercive control that 
criminalises psychological violence under Article 42 of the Convention was included 
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(but not all) of the continental criminal codes.30 These codes may also 
contain other gendered crimes not explicitly covered by the 
Convention, such as forced prostitution (Zwangsprostitution31), non-
consensual termination of pregnancy32 or forced concealment of the 
face (dissimulation forcée du visage33). In some states, calls for legislating 
for femicide as a separate criminal offence from homicide should be 
noted.34 
Second, it is possible to promote a gendered understanding of 
offences by establishing qualified offences (qualifizierte Straftaten, 
infractions aggrevées), which effectively create a separate criminal 
offence from the basic offence, and therefore, again, to recognise a 
special value or qualities of the protected object – here women’s lives 
and health and their particular vulnerabilities in the face of violence. 
For example, an attack against a pregnant woman is automatically an 
aggravating factor in various jurisdictions in relation to many 
offences.35 
Third, a gendered understanding in criminal procedural law 
may be linked to providing special measures of protection for female 
victims, such as interviews led by a female police officer or by 
establishing rape crisis centres for victims of sexual violence.36 
 
in the Irish Domestic Violence Act 2018. Irish Domestic Violence Act 2018 (Act No. 
6/2018) (Ir.), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/2018/act/6/enacted/en/html. 
30 Strafgesetzbuch, supra, note 26 at § 237. 
31 Id. at § 232. 
32 See Vo v. France, 2004-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 42, 58. 
33 Code Penal, supra note 27, at Art. 225-4-10. 
34 Kiteri Garcia, Peut-on imagine une infraction de femicide en France?, THE 
CONVERSATION, https://theconversation.com/peut-on-imaginer-une-infraction-de
-feminicide-en-france-71511#:~:text=Il%20y%20a%20deux%20ans,sur%20le%
20th%C3%A8me%20du%20f%C3%A9minicide (last updated Aug. 26, 2019); See 
also Elisa Leray& Elda Monsalve, Un crime de feminicide en France? A propos de 
l’article 171 de la loi relative a l’egalite et a la citoyennete, LA REVUE DES 
DEOITS DE L’HOMME, Feb. 2017. 
35 Code Penal, supra note 27 at Art. 221-4 al. 9. 
36 See Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against 
Women and Domestic Violence, Council of Eur., art. 25, 2011. See Liz Kelly, 
Mapping support services for victims of violence against women in line with the 
Istanbul Convention Standards, Council of Eur. (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.coe.int/
en/web/genderequality/-/mapping-support-services-for-victims-of-violence-against-
women-in-line-with-the-istanbul-convention-standards. See also Nadera Shalhoub-
2021 ISTANBUL CONVENTION'S EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS 219 
Fourth, sanctions may be provided for that reflect the 
gendered nature of the offences in question. For example, the 
Convention prescribes that the measures relating to perpetrators of 
offences covered by the Convention include withdrawal of parental 
rights37 – a measure that is often divisive according to gender lines.38 
A gendered approach to sanctions also entails a prohibition on 
mitigating sentences on the grounds of custom, tradition, or honour 
for perpetrators of violence against women.39 It is also possible to 
“gender” the punishment of offences by establishing aggravating 
sentencing factors. In France, it is a general aggravating factor at the 
sentencing stage if a crime is committed against another person 
because of his or her sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity.40 
Fifth, it is possible to promote a gendered understanding of 
offences by providing for other legal concepts that reflect a gendered 
approach to violence against women, its consequences and impact. 
This especially concerns the proposition that, on average, women find 
themselves in a weaker socio-economic position41 than men.42 Such a 
gendered approach may not be explicitly found in the Convention. As 
such, obligations on custody and visitation rights per Article 31, on 
 
Kevorkian and Enda Erez, Integrating a Victim Voice in Community. Policing: A 
Feminist Critique, 9 Int’l R. of Victimology, 113-115 (2002). 
37 According to GREVIO, in the context of domestic violence the exercise of joint 
custody is regarded as a means for the aggressor to continue maintaining domination 
over the women and the children. See GREVIO Rapport d’évaluation de référence 
France, Council of Eur. (Nov. 19, 2019), https://rm.coe.int/grevio-inf-2019-16/1680
98c619 (last visited May 24, 2020). 
38 See Linda D. Elrod and Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in 
Child Custody: The Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 FAMILY L. QUARTERLY 
3, 381-418 (2008). 
39 Opuz v. Turkey App no 33401/02 (ECtHR, 9 September 2009), at 91-95, 101-106 
and 196. 
40 Code penal, supra, note 27 at Art.132-77. 
41 See Ingrid Westendorp, The Istanbul Convention; new perspectives for victims of 
domestic violence? MAASTRICHT UNIV. (June 8, 2018), https://www.maastricht
university.nl/blog/2018/06/istanbul-convention-new-perspectives-victims-domestic-
violence. 
42 As per ¶115 of the Explanatory Report to the Istanbul Convention: “[Gendered 
understanding] means that services offered need to demonstrate an approach, relevant 
to their users, which recognises the gendered dynamics, impact and consequences of 
these forms of violence and which operates within a gender equality and human rights 
framework.” 
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legal aid per Article 57, or on compensation per Article 30, are 
formulated in a gender-neutral fashion, as they relate to all victims of 
violent acts covered by the Convention. They also do not provide for 
factoring in gender in designing legislative or other measures. For 
example they could provide for higher compensation for female 
victims, limit the right to legal assistance to women victims, or state 
that in the determination of custody and visitation rights of children,43 
incidents of violence perpetrated by men should be taken into 
account.44 Such measures are not completely inconceivable if the 
drafters “aim at the empowerment and economic independence of 
women victims of violence”45 but are probably dissonant with the 
meaning of justice and equality as developed in the CoE system, as it 
assumes a balancing act between individual rights to family life, non-
discrimination, and effective remedies.46 
On a separate track of the analysis, a gendered understanding 
may follow the proposition that instead of creating new criminal law 
rules that would mitigate gender inequality, existing criminal law 
rules are already gendered in the sense that they disadvantage 
women.47 According to this view, criminal law rules must be amended 
to rectify their inherent gender bias. It is asserted that the existing 
criminal justice system was built for men by men and may become “a 
site of re-victimisation and injustice” in cases involving women, and 
especially female victims of domestic violence.48 Such consequences 
 
43 See Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against 
Women and Domestic Violence, Council of Eur., art. 30-31, 57, 2011. 
44 Although it is true that in the countries’ evaluations, GREVIO is exclusively 
concerned with the safety of mothers who are victims of domestic violence and their 
children in the decision on and exercise of child custody and visitation rights. See 1st 
General Report on Grevio’s Activites, COUNCIL OF EUR. (Apr. 2020), https://rm.coe.
int/1st-general-report-on-grevio-s-activities/16809cd382. 
45 Convention, supra note 21 at Art 18(3). 
46 See Ivana Radacic, Gender Equality Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights, 19 THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L, 2008, at 841. 
47 Or de-gendered criminal rules as a default state, depending on the point of view. 
48 See Kate Fitz-Gibbon & Marion Vannier, Domestic Violence and the Gendered Law 
of Self-Defence in France: the Case of Jacqueline Sauvage, 25 FEMINIST LEGAL 
STUDIES 3, 31č (2017). See also Elizabeth Sheehy and Barbara Hamilton, Thrice 
Punished: Battered Women, Criminal Law and Disinheritance, 8 SOUTHERN CROSS 
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 96, 104-105 (2004). See also Anthony Hopkins and Patricia 
Easteal, Walking in Her Shoes: Battered Women Who Kill in Victoria, Queensland 
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may manifest themselves vis-à-vis both female perpetrators as well as 
female victims – for example, because certain general mitigating 
circumstances may be applied to female perpetrators only with 
difficulty, whereas they are more favourably applied to male 
perpetrators,49 or because certain legal doctrines such as self-defence 
were constructed according to male behaviour or not even recognising 
women’s capacity.50 Historically, this could also be observed in 
making available the defence of coercion at common law, which could 
be advanced by a wife who committed a crime in the presence of her 
husband. It was presumed that she acted under coercion, entitling her 
to be excused from responsibility.51 A gender bias may also affect 
certain sanctions, such as the ban on entry to sporting, cultural, and 
other social events (for example, football banning orders), which are 
predominantly imposed on male perpetrators.52 It can also be argued, 
hypothetically, that certain criminal offences such as the criminal 
offence of failure to help after a car accident53 may be less favourably 
applied to female offenders because men fear injury less than women 
and manage distress better than women.54 A gendered understanding 
of violence, de nouveau, would thus call for accounting for the special 
qualities and vulnerabilities of female perpetrators or female victims 
 
and Western Australia, 35 ALTERNATIVE LAW JOURNAL 3, 132 (2010). See also 
Barbara Hudson, Beyond White Man’s Justice: Race, Gender and Justice in Late 
Modernity, 10 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 1, 29 (2006). 
49 For example, if a perpetrator has taken the initiative to eliminate the harmful 
consequences of the crime or has voluntarily compensated for the damage caused his 
or her criminal sanction will be decreased. However, this mitigating factor is based on 
the premise that women who find themselves in a worse socio-economic situation will 
be fulfilled with more difficulty. 
50 The gendered argument for self-defense is that the law of self-defense was built 
around cases of a one-time fight of men of equal size and strength. See Fitz-Gibbon & 
Vannier, supra 48, at 313 (citing Cass. Crim. 16 October 1979). 
51 The abolition of the defence was recommended as early as 1845. See the Law 
Commission (Law Com. No. 83) Report on Defences of General Application (1977). 
52 See Emma Poulton, Football Hooliganism, in Bonnie Fisher and Steven Lab, eds. 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF VICTIMOLOGY AND CRIME PREVENTION (SAGE Publications, e-
book, 2010). 
53 § 151 zákona č. 40/2009 Sb., trestní zákonník. 
54 See William R. Smith & Marie Torsenssson, Gender Differences in Risk Perception 
and Neutralizing Fear of Crime: Toward Resolving the Paradoxes, 37 THE BRITISH 
JOURNAL OF CRIMINOLOGY 4, 608 (1997). 
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in criminal law.55 If a legal rule is applied to both genders with equal 
results, such a rule cannot be said to be gendered.56 
The Convention states that it requires a gendered 
understanding of domestic violence,57 but recognises that men may 
also be victims of domestic violence, and Parties are encouraged to 
apply the Convention to all victims of domestic violence.58 This can 
only mean that the application of the Convention is gendered with 
regard to certain aspects of preventing and combatting domestic 
violence, while with regard to other aspects, it could remain gender 
neutral. This clash between the Convention’s prescription that States 
Parties should apply its provisions to all victims of domestic violence 
and its mandating of a gendered understanding of violence is already 
apparent in Group of Experts on Action against Violence against 
Women and Domestic Violence, the Convention’s expert monitoring 
group’s (GREVIO)59 evaluations of Parties’ compliance. In the 
Netherlands, GREVIO criticised policy documents that aimed to be 
gender neutral on domestic violence despite recognising that the 
underlying reason for such policy documents was the underreporting 
of domestic violence by men.60 GREVIO, however, noted that “such 
 
55 One must also take account of the de-gendering movement. Consider the difference 
between the statutory definition of rape per the Slovak Criminal Code (Section 
199(1)): “Any person who, by using violence or the threat of imminent violence, 
forces a woman to have sexual intercourse with him...,” and the Czech Criminal Code 
(Section 185(1)), according to which whoever forces another person to have sexual 
intercourse by violence or by a threat of violence, or a threat of other serious 
detriment... However, the legislator may also acknowledge that domestic abuse is a 
gendered crime yet prefer the statutory definition to be gender-neutral so that no victim 
is inadvertently excluded from protection. See Home Office, ‘Government Response 
to the report from the Joint Committee on the draft Domestic Abuse Bill’ (Her 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2019) https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
government-response-to-the-report-from-the-joint-committee-on-the-draft-domestic-
abuse-bill. 
56 In fact, if that weren’t the case, the difference between gendered and gender-neutral 
rules would not exist. 
57 Convention, supra note 21 at Art. 18(3). 
58 Convention, supra note 21 at Art. 1(1)(c). 
59 GREVIO — Group of Experts on Action against Violence against Women and 
Domestic Violence. 
60 GREVIO, Baseline Evaluation Report Netherlands, GREVIO, ¶¶ 29-30, (January 
2020), https://rm.coe.int/09000016809a61f1. 
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considerations lead to the problematic effect that violence against 
women is not recognised as a specific, widespread and gender-based 
form of violence” that differs in severity and types and in the fact that 
vast majority of perpetrators (even where the victim is male) are men.61 
According to GREVIO, this runs contrary to the obligation of paying 
particular attention to women victims of gender-based violence as set 
out in Article 2(2) of the Convention.62 Moreover, GREVIO has 
recently criticised the gender-neutral approach of legal provisions and 
policy documents that address domestic violence in countries such as 
Albania, Denmark and Finland.63 
Thus, it is crucial to understand the extent to which the 
Convention is gendered and in what way it can be applicable to men 
who are victims of domestic violence. One must be cautious when 
searching for a gendered understanding of domestic violence within 
the Convention.64 Certainly, a textual reading may identify some 
gendered provisions: explicit references to female victims appear in 
certain articles, which would suggest that other provisions may relate 
to both male and female victims of domestic violence where no such 
explicit reference occurs. The obligation to establish shelters, per 
Article 23, for example, relates to victims, although especially to women 
and their children, which suggests that male victims could also be 
covered by the scope of this article. A second approach involves 
combining a textual reading with a teleological interpretation of the 
relevant provisions. There are two provisions that most likely 
implicate a gendered differentiation of domestic violence: Article 16, 
which envisages preventive intervention against (male) perpetrators 
 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at ¶ 30. 
63 GREVIO, supra note 44, at 25. 
64 According to McQuigg, “[d]omestic violence is repeatedly separated out as a term 
within the Convention from violence against women generally. This relates to a 
broader issue as to whether a gender-neutral approach should be adopted towards 
domestic violence or whether a gendered approach is appropriate, a matter which has 
already raised substantial debate.” McQuigg therefore argues that the Convention 
seeks to strike a compromise between a gender-neutral approach and an approach 
conceptualising domestic violence as a form of violence against women only. Ronagh 
McQuigg, Domestic Violence: Applying a Human Rights Discourse, in Sarah Hilder 
and Vanessa Bettinson, eds. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 
ON PROTECTION, PREVENTION, at 27 (Palgrave McMillan, 2016). 
224 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 28 
of domestic violence and Article 12, which may be seen as casting self-
defence and other prevention measures as an intervention that 
contributes to improving women’s agency and reducing their 
vulnerability to violence. 65 
Article 16 prescribes that Parties should establish or support 
programmes aimed at teaching perpetrators of domestic violence to 
adopt non-violent behaviour in interpersonal relationships with a 
view to preventing further violence and changing violent behavioural 
patterns. As the Explanatory Report makes clear, the Convention 
prescribes certain core elements to such programmes, which explicitly 
assume that those programmes will be visited by male perpetrators of 
domestic violence, as they “should encourage [them] . . . to examine 
their attitudes and beliefs towards women.”66 Moreover, a collection 
of papers on the Convention’s implementation introduces two sample 
curricula which are directed at adult male perpetrators.67 Therefore, 
although the Article is formulated in a gender-neutral fashion 
regarding roles of victims/perpetrators, its implementation may be 
strongly conditioned by gender. According to Article 12, Parties 
should take necessary measures to prevent all forms of violence, and 
especially encourage men and boys to contribute actively to such 
prevention.68 Under this Article, preventive measures at the societal 
level are strongly gender determined and focus on masculinity, 
devaluing women, male entitlement, honour codes and the masculine 
self.69 A handful of other preventive measures are constructed in a 
 
65 Opponents of the Convention warn against the breadth of Article 12 which may 
become a vehicle for substantially redrafting educational material. See ADF 
International, Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence 
against Women and Domestic Violence and Possible European Union Accession to it 
(May 12, 2017) https://adflegal.blob.core.windows.net/international-content/docs/
default-source/default-document-library/resources/media-resources/europe/istanbul-
convention-extensive-memo.pdf?sfvrsn=2. 
66 Convention, supra note 21 at 104. 
67 The US Duluth programme and the Swedish Integrated Domestic Abuse 
Programme. 
68 Convention, supra, note 21 at 88. 
69 Marianne Hester and Sarah-Jane Lilley, Preventing Violence Against Women: 
Article 12 of the Istanbul Convention, in A COLLECTION OF PAPERS ON THE COUNCIL 
OF EUROPE CONVENTION ON PREVENTING AND COMBATING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 11 (Council of Europe, 2014), https://rm.coe.int/16800d383
a. 
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gender-neutral fashion, such as poverty pockets, family stress, alcohol 
and drug abuse and early trauma.70 Article 12 encompasses a plethora 
of tools, including self-defence training linked to the reduction of 
victimisation, challenging stereotypes and empowering women.71 
Most likely, it will prove difficult to find proponents of the proposition 
that self-defence training of men or changing the pattern of devaluing 
men would constitute an effective means of preventing female-on-
male domestic violence. As McQuigg notes, these Articles reveal the 
Convention as far from gender neutral on issues of domestic 
violence.72 
THE CONVENTION’S IMPLEMENTATION AND EVIDENCE IN DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE CASES 
The Convention’s ambivalent nature, as gender-neutral 
and/or gendered, renders its applicability problematic with regard to 
male victims of domestic violence, and in some respects, to female 
perpetrators of domestic violence.73 This problematic applicability is 
 
70 Id. 
71 Resolution on the Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion, by the 
European Union, of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, Eur. Parl.Doc. (COM(2016)0109 – 
2016/0062(NLE)), (Sep.12, 2017), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?
uri=CELEX%3A52017IP0329. 
72 McQuigg, supra note 64, at 32. 
73 Female-to-male violence exists. One may debate its extent, nature, severity or 
collection of data. Two types of domestic violence are usually distinguished: intimate 
terrorism and situational violence. Whereas situational violence affects men to the 
same degree as women, in intimate terrorism. See Jessica Eckstein, Intimate Terrorism 
and Situational Couple Violence: Classification Variability Across Five Methods to 
Distinguish Johnson’s Violent Relationship Types, 32 VIOLENCE VICTIMOLOGY 6, 955 
(2017); see also Marianne I. Lien and Jørgen Lorentzen, MEN’S EXPERIENCE OF 
VIOLENCE IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS, Palgrave Studies in Victims and Victimology, 
157 (2019). Data also suggests that men and women have different motivations for 
using violence, with women usually protecting themselves or their children, retaliating 
their partner’s violence and expressing fear and anger and men acting coercively in an 
attempt to control their partners. See Rochelle Braaf and Isobelle Meyering, The 
Gender Debate in Domestic Violence: The Role of Data, Australian Domestic and 
Family Violence Clearinghouse, Issues Paper 25 (2013) (suggesting in almost half of 
the cases where the perpetrator of domestic violence is a woman, the male victim had 
previously committed violence against her). 
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also underlined by the fact that the Convention was drafted on the 
basis of evidence that showed a predominant gender pattern in 
domestic violence,74 whereas there are other solid studies that show 
that gender differences are relatively small in cases of milder forms of 
physical domestic violence, and that both men and women are 
frequently subjected to control and abuse in relationships.75 Moreover, 
the respective roles of victims and perpetrators, from a legal point of 
view, both in symmetrical (equally perpetrated by men and women) 
and asymmetrical conflicts,76 may swap rapidly.77 
The clash between gendered and gender-neutral approaches to 
domestic violence is, however, not unique to the Convention. For a 
long time, the clash was subject to a feminist critique of laws that 
capture the “male view” of the world and that are regarded as unjust.78 
In this critique, the operation of the laws of self-defence have become 
a paradigmatic case in point.79 Cases of women killing their abusive 
partners have become one of the longest debated and best-known 
examples of the gender tension in criminal laws in many 
jurisdictions.80 Under the most extreme paradigm, one may imagine 
 
74 See CAHVIO, supra note 15; see also Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human 
Rights, The Istanbul Convention protects women, without hidden purposes, 25 (2018) 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/the-istanbul-convention-protects-
women-without-hidden-purposes. 
75 See Lien & Lorentzen, supra note 73. See also Braaf & Meyering, supra note 73, at 
1,10 (observing that family conflict researchers argue that family violence is equally 
perpetrated by men and women and that men and women are similarly motivated to 
use violence). 
76 See Michaels S. Kimmel, “Gender Symmetry” in Domestic Violence, 8 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 11, 1332-63 (2002). 
77 See Jiří Hořák, TRESTNĚPRÁVNÍ A KRIMINOLOGICKÉ ASPEKTY VRAŽD (PhD Thesis, 
Charles University in Prague, 2010). 
78 See Carol Smart, supra note 12 at 19-56. 
79 See Joshua Dressler, Feminist (or “Feminist”) Reform of Self-Defense Law: Some 
Critical Reflections, 93 MARQUETTE L, REV. 4, 1477-81 (2010); Victoria Nourse, Self-
defense, in Markus Dirk Dubber and Tatjana Hörnle, eds. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF CRIMINAL LAW, Oxford University Press, 623-24 (2014). 
80 See Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation 
Defense, GEO. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPER, 12-106 (1997); see also 
Alexandra Lysova, Victims but also Perpetrators: Women’s Experiences of Partner 
Violence, in Helmut Kury, Slawomir Redo and Evelyn Shea, eds. WOMEN AND 
CHILDREN AS VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS: BACKGROUND, PREVENTION, 
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that a woman suffering from so-called battered woman syndrome who 
killed her abusive partner in a non-confrontational situation advances 
a claim of self-defence to avoid criminal responsibility.81 Cases in 
which deadly force is employed in response to a relatively minor threat 
or assault also appear problematic.82 Depending on the jurisdiction, 
the woman’s actions may fall within the legal definition of self-
defence, but may also be considered “excessive,” fall within the legal 
definitions of other defences, or may not fit the legal definitions of 
circumstances excluding/mitigating criminal responsibility at all. It is 
often argued that the legal definitions of defences in many jurisdictions 
do not accommodate the experiences of women who kill in response 
to long-term grave domestic violence and who therefore cannot escape 
criminal responsibility.83 The idea is that the case of women in 
situations of domestic violence is fundamentally different not only to 
that of the general population, but also to male victims of domestic 
violence.84 
The Convention’s applicability to such cases has the potential 
to be especially controversial. The Convention does not explicitly 
provide for gendered rules of self-defence or other defences. The 
Explanatory Report only notes that other legally justifiable acts, for 
example, acts committed in self-defence, in defence of property, or for 
necessary medical procedures, would not give rise to criminal 
sanctions under the Convention.85 However, the Convention is a 
comprehensive legal text in the area of criminal law and domestic 
violence, mandating a gendered approach; it therefore likely has a 
certain stance, and it is difficult to imagine it permitting diverging 
practices on this issue amongst its Parties. As already noted by 
GREVIO, charging victims for injuries inflicted upon the abuser in self-
defence is considered a form of secondary victimisation, and is 
 
REINTEGRATION: SUGGESTIONS FOR SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS, Springer Int’l Pub’g, 
505-37, (2016). 
81 See Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not 
Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1, 217, 229-231 (2002). 
82 See Aileen McColgan, In Defence of Battered Women who Kill, 13 OXFORD 
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 4, 508–529 (1993). 
83 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, REVIEW OF THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 
ch. 4, 158 https://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/_files/p97-ch04.pdf. 
84 See McColgan, supra note 82, at 514. 
85 Convention, supra note 21, at 156. 
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therefore incompatible with the Convention.86 Currently, diverging 
practices exist within the CoE on this issue. Looking at the German 
example, the lower courts have denied any defences and excuses to 
battered defendants, and have dealt with long-term abuse at the 
sentencing stage only.87 Perpetrators who kill their intimate partners 
via open aggression are likely to face a lower sentence that victims who 
kill their intimate partners while they are asleep.88 Separately, the 
French Assemblée Nationale is currently debating a legislative proposal 
that would introduce a special defence to criminal responsibility based 
on a history of domestic violence.89 The proposal arose in the context 
of a deep public sentiment of injustice originating from the Jacqueline 
Sauvage case, which ended with a complete Presidential pardon in 
2016.90 The UK Government has pledged to consider a new defence 
based upon a history of domestic violence in the future.91 The 
subsequent chapters of this article will provide a more thorough 
analysis of the controversies around the various English, French, and 
German laws of homicide, self-defence, and domestic violence. 
Without containing explicit gendered provisions, the 
Convention may secure a converging gendered approach via other 
means, namely evidentiary rules and practice.92 Evidence comes to the 
fore with the centrality of investigations in domestic violence and 
other criminal law cases.93 Investigations relate to the obligation of due 
diligence enshrined in Article 5 that represents one of the overarching 
obligations, and more specifically in Article 49(2). According to Article 
54 (Investigations and evidence), “Parties shall take the necessary 
 
86 GREVIO, supra note 44, at 25. 
87 Kerstin Braun, Till Death Us Do Part: Homicide Defences for Women in Abusive 
Relationships- Similar Problems-Different Responses in Germany and Australia, 23 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 10, 1 (2017). 
88 Id. at 9. 
89 See infra at p. 43 and note 284. 
90 See Fitz-Gibbon & Vannier, supra 48, at 316-19. 
91 The UK Government Response to the report from the Joint Committee, supra note 
55. 
92 Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender in Evidence: Masculine Norms vs. Feminist Reforms, 
19 HARVARD WOMEN’S L. J. 127, 1996. 
93 See Elisabeth McDonald, Gender Bias and the Law of Evidence: The Link between 
Sexuality and Credibility, 24 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 175 (1993); see also 
GREVIO, Evaluation of Italy (Oct. 30, 2018), www.befreecooperativa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/GREVIO-REPORT-FINAL-convertito.pdf. 
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legislative or other measures to ensure that, in any civil or criminal 
proceedings, evidence relating to the sexual history and conduct of the 
victim shall be permitted only when it is relevant and necessary.” This 
Article particularly regards the prosecution of sexual offence. Yet, the 
Explanatory memorandum shows clearly that the purpose of this 
provision is to combat “the perpetuation of damaging stereotypes,” 
and it calls for a context-sensitive assessment of evidence in the 
investigation and prosecution of violence against women.94 Certain 
evidence relating to the behaviour of victims should not lead to moral 
judgments, seeing the victim as “immoral” and “not worthy” of legal 
protection, thereby creating inequality before law.95 The provision is 
otherwise silent on specific evidence in domestic violence cases and 
circumstances of self-defence. 
GREVIO has already made a number of observations on 
investigations and evidence in such cases. Per GREVIO, thorough 
investigations are necessary to differentiate between ill-treatment that 
would amount to habitual crime and individual episodes of violence, 
which cannot be ascribed to a pattern of abusive behaviour.96 In this 
regard, GREVIO criticised Italian investigations for not even 
attempting to put together enough information to reconstruct a pattern 
of behaviour that would enable its proper classification. It also 
condemned any legal classification of violence against women based 
on victim’s tolerance, without making a complaint or defending 
herself.97 In its report on Finland, GREVIO noted that the Finnish 
police focus excessively on evidence of physical violence, and do not 
take into account the context and history of violence and primary 
aggressor analysis, such that if there is “mutual violence” both persons 
will be viewed as perpetrators and victims.98 GREVIO therefore 
“underscore[d] the importance of a diligent response of the statutory 
agencies in investigating allegations of domestic violence, based on a 
proper understanding of the nature and cycles of violence in intimate 
 
94 Convention, supra note 21, at 191, 277. 
95 Id. at 277. 
96 GREVIO. ‘Baseline Evaluation Report Italy’. GREVIO/Inf(2019)18 (Council of 
Europe, 2020), ¶ 15. 
97 Id. at ¶ 14. 
98 GREVIO, Baseline Evaluation Report Finland, GREVIO/Inf (2019) 9 (Council of 
Europe, 2019). 
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partnerships.”99 The consequences of a sluggish investigative 
approach are not confined to the extreme cases of battered women 
killings but affect day-to-day protection of victims of domestic 
violence, for example by not being able to obtain barring or protection 
orders and access to justice.100 
In this way, the Convention links evidentiary rules and 
practice to access to justice:101 gender stereotypes and cultural 
attitudes towards women represent barriers to justice,102 as well as 
discriminatory or gender-blind frameworks which do not take into 
account women’s social situations.103 Therefore, in the investigation 
and prosecution of cases of violence against women and domestic 
violence, it is compliant with the Convention to use expert testimonies 
to dispel myths or misconceptions surrounding domestic violence and 
to provide context for victim behaviour.104 A Training of Trainers Manual 
based on the Convention, and written for the CoE, for example, states 
that it is a common myth that women are as violent as men and that 
“controversies about these figures are because women do use violence 
against their partner often as a reaction or defence to the abuse.”105 
Evidence of prior incidents of violence may be particularly relevant in 
 
99 GREVIO — Report Italy, supra note 96, at ¶ 16. 
100 Id. at ¶ 15. 
101 See Shazia Choudhry, Women’s Access to Justice: A Guide for Legal Practitioners 
(October 2018) https://rm.coe.int/advanced-womens-access-to-justice-eng/16808e99
ef (last visited 14 October 2019). 
102 GREVIO encouraged French authorities to continue developing, including through 
training, a non-stereotypical understanding of the phenomenon of violence against 
women by law enforcement. See GREVIO -Rapport France, supra note 37, ¶ 229. 
103 Konul D. Gasimova, Guideline on Gender-Sensitive Approach for Adjudicating 
Gender-Based Violence Cases, http://www.fbih.cest.gov.ba/images/doclink/Gender-
Guideline---WB-JTIs.pdf (last visited 14 October 2019). 
104 Id. Gasimova also suggests that battered woman syndrome must be taken into 
consideration by relevant authorities and that justice actors should be aware of the 
impact of trauma such as one relating to victim’s perplexing behaviour and other 
patterns. 
105 Anna C. Baldry & Elisabeth Duban, Improving the Effectiveness of Law 
Enforcement and Justice Officers in Combatting Violence against Women and 
Domestic Violence (Council of Europe, 2016) https://rm.coe.int/16806acdfd (last 
visited 2 January 2020). 
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proving the extent of harm and predicting risks.106 Furthermore, social 
framework experts107 should be considered in addition to clinical 
experts in order to explain victim behaviour.108 Accordingly, when 
reviewing evidence, judges need to consider the dynamics of domestic 
violence and its impact on victim behaviour when reviewing evidence. 
The Convention also prescribes that Parties must enable victims to be 
heard, to supply evidence and have their views, needs, and concerns 
presented and considered.109 
These are very detailed evidentiary rules. They mandate not 
only what evidence is admissible but also what evidence is relevant 
and probative and what needs to be brought into a case. They tell 
judicial and police authorities what information to cast doubt upon, 
and when to call in experts to interpret the information. As is visible at 
the level of monitoring of the Convention’s implementation, gendered 
evidentiary rules and practices have the primary power to affect the 
applicability of the Convention in domestic violence cases. 
ECTHR CASE-LAW ON INVESTIGATION AND EVIDENCE IN DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE CASES 
The Convention does not exist in a vacuum and is thus not the 
only source of gendered rules and practices in investigation and 
evidence. Other legal sources may be considered, particularly Article 
2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
 
106 See Council of Europe, Preventing and Combating Domestic Violence against 
Women, A Learning Resource for Training Law Enforcement and Justice Officers 
(January 2016) https://rm.coe.int/16805970c1 (last visited 14 October 2019). It is said 
that the 2016 learning resource is firmly grounded on the standards of the Istanbul 
Convention and on good practice in implementing these standards. 
107 To the shift from clinical to social framework evidence, see Rebecca Bradfield, 
Understanding the Battered Woman Who Kills her Violent Partner — The 
Admissibility of Expert Evidence of Domestic Violence in Australia, 9 PSYCHIATRY, 
PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 1, 177 (2011). 
108 Council of Europe (2008), Combating Violence against Women: Minimum 
Standards for Support Services https://www.coe.int/t/dg2/equality/domesticviolence
campaign/Source/EG-VAW-CONF(2007)Study%20rev.en.pdf (last visited 14 
October 2019). 
109 Article 56 of the Convention. 
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Against Women (CEDAW Convention),110 and ECtHR rulings, as they 
could have a distinct impact upon the implementation of the 
Convention’s obligations111 The due diligence obligation imposed 
upon CoE States regarding the investigation and gathering of evidence 
in domestic violence cases has been a subject of ECtHR case law for 
many years.112 Although the Court’s primary concern has not been in 
the use of expert evidence in dispelling myths surrounding domestic 
violence, the Court has treated certain issues related to victim-centred 
and gender-sensitive approaches to investigation. 
First, the Court has consistently scrutinised states’ records 
regarding conducting effective investigations into domestic violence 
cases under various European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
articles.113 It recognised that domestic violence cases are of a special 
character, and that domestic violence can take many forms, including 
psychological abuse.114 As Judge Hüseynov noted in his concurring 
opinion in Kurt v. Austria, the recent trend in the Court’s jurisprudence 
has been “to deviate from an incident-based understanding of 
domestic violence,” and instead to consider risk emanating from 
domestic violence as from “a continuous practice of intimidation and 
abuse.”115 It remains to be seen whether this trend will be further 
maintained in the Court’s practice. For now, it is interpreted as a 
consistently applied requirement emanating from the Court’s case law 
that a state is under an obligation to conduct an investigation with 
special diligence into all acts of domestic violence that the specific 
 
110 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States 
Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (Dec. 16, 2010), CEDAW/C/GC/28, https://www.
refworld.org/docid/4d467ea72.html. 
111 Volodina v. Russia, App no. 41261/17, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 92–98 (2019). 
112 Ilias Bantekas & Lutz Oette. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 
(Cambridge University Press, 2016), 506-507; See also Lee Hasselbacher. State 
Obligations Regarding Domestic Violence: The European Court of Human Rights, 
Due Diligence, And International Legal Minimums of Protection, Northwestern 8 
Journal of International Human Rights 2, 200-1 (2010). 
113 In particular, Article 2 and Article 8 of the Convention. 
114 Valiulienė v. Lithuania, App no. 33234/07, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 69 (2013). 
115 Case of Kurt v. Austria, App. no. 62903/15, Eur. Ct. H.R., Concurring opinion of 
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nature of domestic violence requires.116 The authorities must make a 
“serious attempt to establish the circumstances of the assaults” and 
take an overall view of the series of violent acts.117 This obligation also 
relates to the fact that effective investigation is regarded as a measure 
that is intended to prevent further violence, injuries, or loss of life. The 
police must therefore analyse specific evidence concerning the reality 
and the degree of danger posed by a domestic abuser.118 The protective 
function of investigation was emphasised in T.M. and C.M. v. Moldova, 
a case in which the Court held that a law that requires injuries to be of 
a certain degree of severity in order to initiate a criminal investigation 
undermines the efficiency of protection afforded to victims.119 The 
Court also held that the police cannot raise the bar for evidence 
required to launch criminal proceedings too high.120 In Volodina v. 
Russia, the Court also concluded that it is incompatible with Article 3 
obligations to make a criminal investigation strictly dependent upon 
the pursuance of complaints by the victim, given her particularly 
vulnerable situation,121 an outcome that is currently reinforced by the 
Convention.122 At a deeper level of analysis, the Court’s case law 
provides practical signposts for a contextual approach to investigation 
and evidence assessment. It is when an investigation is difficult, when 
there are conflicting statements and little physical evidence, that the 
Court is called upon to conduct a “context sensitive assessment of the 
credibility of the statements made and for verification of all the 
surrounding circumstances.”123 
 
116 Volodina v. Russia, at 92. 
117 Id. at 97. 
118 Liu v. Russia, App no. 42086/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007). 
119 T.M. and C.M. v. The Republic of Moldova, App no. 26608/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 47 
(2014). 
120 Volodina v. Russia, at 98. 
121 Id. at 92-98. 
122 Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against 
women and domestic violence art. 55, May 11, 2011, C.E.T.S. 210. 
123 M. and C. v. Romania, App no 29032/04 (ECtHR 27 September 2011), at 116. See 
also Maria Sjöholm. GENDER-SENSITIVE NORM INTERPRETATION BY REGIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW SYSTEMS (Brill | Nijhoff, 2018) 250-251. Context-sensitive 
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The Court has focused on at least three important aspects of 
effective investigation, namely time, reasonableness, and diligence. 
The investigation must not only be prompt but also thorough.124 This 
means that evidence concerning acts of domestic violence must be 
secured125 using reasonable means, such as witness testimony, on-site 
inspection126 and forensic evidence,127 or an autopsy in case of injuries 
causing death.128 The nature and degree of fact-finding depends on the 
circumstances of the particular case, and the minimum threshold of an 
investigation’s effectiveness must be assessed with regard to the 
practical realities of the work involved in the investigation.129 
However, even if it is not possible to reduce the investigation work to 
a simple check-list, with regard to domestic violence, it is possible to 
infer certain basic elements. 130 It is almost self-evident that if the police 
lose time, they may not be able to secure the evidence needed. Passage 
of time inevitably erodes the amount and quality of the evidence 
available.131 Therefore, a medical assessment and other forensic 
evidence must be scheduled immediately after the reported 
incident.132 The same applies to rape cases, where in situ inspection 
must be carried out promptly.133 In P.M. v. Bulgaria, the Court 
criticized the fact that urgent investigative measures, such as the 
commissioning of an expert team in the case of rape and interviewing 
the victim, had taken far too long to be deemed effective investigative 
measures.134 
Finally, the Court attempted to tackle certain myths and 
stereotypes linked to domestic violence, while couching them in terms 
of discrimination issues. The Court held that it is unacceptable that the 
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police hear the perpetrator’s version of the assaults only, and that they 
should not trivialise reported events.135 The police must also not seek 
to assume the role of mediator and try to convince victims to return 
home.136 Drawn from analogy to rape cases, the Court stressed that the 
allegation that a rape victim was under the influence of alcohol or 
other circumstances concerning the victim’s behaviour or personality 
cannot dispense the authorities from the obligation to effectively 
investigate.137 This would amount, in the Court’s view, to “the general 
and discriminatory judicial passivity [of the police] creating a climate 
that was conducive to domestic violence.”138 Actions of the police or 
the courts that run contrary to Article 14 of the ECHR would be 
considered discriminatory and reflect an attitude on the basis of which 
the police effectively condone violence against women and domestic 
violence.139 
The Court has laid down certain procedural as well as 
substantive requirements regarding investigation and evidence in 
domestic violence cases, as well as in other cases involving violence 
against women. However, there have been limitations as to what the 
Court could achieve in promoting women’s access to justice, given the 
factual situation of the cases presented to the Court and the particular 
legal framework under which it adjudicates (namely the ECHR). For 
example, as of January 2020, the Court has not adjudicated any case 
combining killing in self-defence as a response to domestic violence. 
However, in June 2019, the case of Natalya Tunikova was 
communicated to the Court, in which Mrs. Tunikova was subject to a 
series of assaults by her former partner, and on one occasion, she 
grabbed a knife and stabbed him. Both suffered injuries, and Mrs. 
Tunikova filed a private-prosecution complaint; however, she was 
later found guilty of causing grievous bodily harm. A Moscow Court 
found that her use of force in self-defence had not been justifiable.140 It 
remains to be seen how the Court will further develop standards of 
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access to justice for female victims of domestic violence. However, any 
action by the Court in this regard will have to take account of several 
serious limitations of certain inviolable rights of the perpetrator, 
including Article 3 ECHR, which prescribes that torture, inhumane or 
degrading treatment or punishment is prohibited in absolute terms, 
irrespective of the circumstances or the victim’s behaviour.141 From 
today’s perspective, the Court’s results may seem moderate, reflecting 
“common sense,” certain gender-neutral standards (forensic 
evidence), and, at best, basic gender sensitivity.  
The Convention goes two steps further than the ECHR 
framework. It represents a development in international law, which is 
“supported by the findings of modern psychology” and in which 
domestic violence emerges “as an autonomous human rights 
violation.”142 The context in which the Convention is forged by 
scientific evidence explaining the consequences and effects of violence 
against women on health,143 employment,144 life outcomes, as well as 
multi-generational trauma;145 the causes of domestic violence;146 the 
vulnerabilities of certain victimised groups; the prevention of 
victimisation and secondary victimisation;147 in addition to the social 
context in which the violence occurs and the context in which battered 
women kill their abusive partners.148 
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The question remains as to how to integrate these findings in a 
legal system, as finding a way of constructing procedural standards 
and of balancing the procedural relationship between the perpetrator 
and the victim in the light of these scientific findings seems necessary. 
Furthermore, the legislator should consider how to construct 
substantive legal rules against the backdrop of scientific findings that 
clarify the context in which violence is taking place. It is also a question 
of further policy choices to design a criminal justice system to help 
victims to cope as best as possible with the consequences of crimes. In 
any law reform prompted by a gendered understanding of violence, it 
is also germane to ask how to account for the behaviour of the victim 
in assessing the criminal responsibility of the perpetrator. In the most 
difficult cases, a legislator may further inquire how to assess the 
victim’s criminal responsibility, if scientific evidence can explain the 
motive, intent, or inevitability of her/his conduct (state of mind). In 
particular, the development of battered woman syndrome, the cycle of 
violence, and learned helplessness in the late 1970s by Walker 
represented a major breakthrough in understanding of criminal 
behaviour in the context of domestic violence.149 What general 
criminal law rules should be adopted to reflect the scientific findings 
as credibly as possible while avoiding sweeping conclusions about 
victims of domestic violence? Could the Convention’s evidentiary 
requirements have any bearing on how such criminal law rules are 
construed? An answer to these questions can be provided by 
examining certain common law jurisdictions that have methodically 
considered similar issues in their reform processes in the past. In the 
next part, the article will focus primarily on various solutions offered 
to the question of how to reform criminal law and respond to cases 
where an abused woman kills her domestic tormentor. 
FROM EVIDENCE TO LAW REFORM, FROM LAW REFORM TO EVIDENCE 
Since the 1950s, common law jurisdictions have 
institutionalised a particular process of reforming laws by establishing 
bespoke independent law reform commissions.150 Law reform is 
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DAME J. OF L., ETHICS & PUB. POL. 2, 321 (1992). 
150 Rees, supra note 18. 
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driven by the objective of simplifying, consolidating but also revising 
and repealing the existing law.151 Almost all major common law 
jurisdictions with an established law reform commission have held 
discussions about the gendered conceptualisation of self-defence as 
well as other legal defences. In our analysis, we included the final 
reports and recommendations of the law reform commissions of 
Australia, England & Wales, Ireland and New Zealand152 tackling the 
use of self-defence by victims of long-term domestic violence, either as 
part of a broader review of defences in criminal law, a review of the 
laws of homicide, a legal response to domestic violence, or a review of 
the laws of evidence. We did not consider reports that provided 
general recommendations in domestic violence cases, such as 
concerning child custody reform, review of property rights, or orders 
of protection.153 
We searched through the outputs of all such commissions that 
employ a law reform method modelled on reviewing the operation of 
laws, receiving submissions from professionals as well as the general 
public, conducting a comparative analysis as well as a literature 
 
151 See Commonwealth Secretariat, CHANGING THE LAW. A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LAW 
REFORM (2017). 
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Abuse: Towards an Effective Legal Response” of the Alberta Law Reform Institute 
or the 1995 Report of Law Reform Commission of Nova Scotia “From Rhetoric to 
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at one point the latter report mentions the Canadian landmark case of a battered 
women killing her husband (R. v. Lavallee [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852). This article also does 
not consider the 1997 Report of the New South Wales (NSW) Law Reform 
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Report on Self-Defence and Provocation of the Law Reform Committee of the 
Northern Territory. We also did not consider changes to laws of self-defence induced 
by a high court ruling in cases concerning battered women (Canada). 
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review, as we considered this method particularly thorough.154 This 
method reflects the fact that the need for law reform may come from 
the bottom up: from individual cases and the law that they develop, as 
well as from the top – new scientific evidence and knowledge, as well 
as legislative (policy) changes.155 In the selected jurisdictions, law 
reform in this area has come about as a reaction to the criticism of the 
operation of the laws of self-defence as well as other defences in the 
light of new or newly explained social context (criminological and 
psychological scientific evidence), or to legal uncertainty, and 
alternatively, to an identified bias in the operation of the laws 
undermining the idea of fairness and equality before the law. 
Particularly in the area of legal defences, the law reform method has 
helped to demonstrate how a gendered reconsideration of a single 
legal concept requires reconsideration of legal principles governing 
the structure of that concept and causes a cascade effect. This, in turn, 
requires specific evidentiary considerations. In the analysis below, we 
omitted the part of the reports that dealt with the defence of 
diminished responsibility as a partial defence to murder available to 
those who were suffering from certain abnormalities of the mind, as it 
requires case-specific psychological expert evidence, usually on post-
traumatic stress disorder or depression.156 
1. New Zealand 
The New Zealand Law Commission examined the issue of 
domestic violence and defences in criminal law in three separate 
reports. The first report, in 2001, dealt with “Some Criminal Defences 
with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants.” The second, in 
2007, treated “The Partial Defence of Provocation.” The third, from 
2016, was entitled “Understanding Family Violence: Reforming the 
 
154 See Burke & Byrne, supra note 19. 
155 See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and 
Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. OF PENN. L. REV. 2, 388-460 
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156 Diminished responsibility is a statutory defence in England, New South Wales, 
Queensland, Northern Territory. It has origins in Scottish common law in HM 
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Criminal Law Relating to Homicide,” and is currently awaiting a 
legislative response. 
In the most recent report, the Commission noted that there are 
differences between the position of men and women in pleading self-
defence. In the Commission’s view, “[t]he failure to equally 
accommodate the ways women use lethal force to defend themselves 
or another constitutes a gender bias in the operation of the law.”157 
Persisting misconceptions of how family violence operates may affect 
a jury’s assessment of the defendant’s credibility or the reasonableness 
of his or her actions.158 The Commission emphasised the need to 
understand family violence as “a pattern of harmful behaviour with a 
cumulative effect and a form of entrapment.”159 The Commission 
identified problems with imminence and a lack of alternatives, as two 
concepts traditionally assisting in the reasonableness assessment, in 
the context of family violence.160 Focusing on the proof of the 
immediacy requirement, the jury may be less likely to hear evidence 
on relationship history, and even where the evidence of past abuse is 
admitted it may work against the defendant.161 In light of the evidence 
reviewed, the Commission found that the immediacy requirement 
may impede victims of family violence from relying on self-defence.162 
Therefore, the Commission proposed that a new provision should be 
inserted into the Crimes Act 1961 to ensure that, where a person is 
responding to family violence, self-defence may apply even if that 
person is responding to a threat that is not imminent.163 
As regards the proportionality element of the defence, the 
Commission observed that due to differences in size and strength, 
women are likely to use a weapon, typically a kitchen knife, to defend 
themselves against an abusive partner armed only with his fists.164 The 
proportionality requirement thus appears particularly problematic in 
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non-confrontational situations and in cases where simplistic 
measuring of forces fail. Despite the difficulties that appeared in New 
Zealand case law, the Commission concluded that the proportionality 
requirement could accommodate victims of family violence, provided 
there is a proper understanding of all the circumstances, as well as an 




In 2004, the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) 
published an extensive report on defences to homicide. The work took 
account of the social context in which killings typically occur. The most 
significant line of inquiry of the VLRC was whether, despite the 
theoretical possibility that the common law doctrine of self-defence 
could accommodate the family violence context and other relevant 
evidence, the practice of the application of the legal concept of self-
defence failed to cover women who kill their abusive partners in self-
defence.166 
The VLRC recommended against the introduction of a 
separate defence for persons who kill in response to family violence. It 
concluded that reforms should focus on “ensuring that self-defence 
properly accommodates women’s experiences, rather than on creating 
a special defence for women who kill in response to family 
violence.”167 The VLRC’s recommendations resulted in adoption of the 
Victorian Crimes (Homicide) Act, which came into effect in 2005, 
amending the Crimes Act 1958.168 The Act involved two key reforms: it 
defined the law of self-defence in respect of homicide offences and 
provided legislative guidance on the admissibility of family violence 
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evidence in the context of homicide offences.169 Since 2014, thanks to 
further changes to the law, it is possible to rely on self-defence in cases 
of family violence even where a person uses excessive force or the 
person is responding to a harm that is not immediate, as long as the 
person believed it to be a reasonable response in the circumstances as 
s/he perceived them.170 This legislation also amended relevant 
evidence laws and reinforced jury directions to accommodate 
considerations of family violence.171 
b) Queensland 
In Queensland, following a recommendation by the 
Queensland Law Reform Commission (QLRC), the Criminal Code 
(Abusive Domestic Relationship Defence and Another Matter) 
Amendment Act 2010 amended the Criminal Code by introducing a 
new partial defence to murder of killing in an abusive domestic 
relationship. The QLRC reviewed defences available to battered 
women who kill as a part of a broader review of the excuse of accident 
and the defence of provocation in 2008.172 Its analysis focused, inter 
alia, on modification of the law to obtain substantive gender 
equality.173 In the QLRC’s view, substantive gender equality may be 
achieved by modifying the law where it inhibits deserving claims to 
mitigation only because of rules derived from a particular gender 
model of human behaviour.174 However, the Commission refused to 
distort the defence of provocation in an attempt to accommodate the 
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position of a battered person who kills, as long as the circumstances in 
which battered persons killed their abuser do not resemble a provoked 
killing.175 Therefore, it suggested to develop a separate defence for 
battered persons that reflects scientific evidence about the effects of a 
seriously abusive relationship on a battered person.176 It presented 
such a defence as gender neutral. 
c) Tasmania 
The Tasmanian Law Reform Institute (TLRI) noted that 
“uncertainty about the availability of self-defence at trial means that 
women tend to plead guilty to manslaughter in cases that 
‘demonstrate strong defensive components on the facts’ and might 
result in an acquittal on the basis of self-defence.”177 In Tasmania, the 
law of self-defence in the circumstances of domestic violence has thus 
far remained untested. The TLRI therefore recommended that the law 
in Tasmania should be reformed to allow self-defence to better 
accommodate the claims of those who use violence in response to 
domestic violence.178 The Institute followed the Australian Law 
Reform Commission in recognising broader policy issues behind the 
law reform: an integrated approach to support of victims of domestic 
violence.179 However, crisis accommodation, counselling, or 
protection are not enough. According to the TLRI, the criminal law 
must also recognise the experience of victims of domestic violence who 
themselves kill.180 “This involves addressing wider consideration than 
the substantive law of self-defence, such as relevant evidentiary 
provisions and provisions in relation to jury directions.”181 However, 
the TLRI did not choose to follow the Queensland approach as regards 
a separate partial defence of killing for self-preservation in a domestic 
relationship. It considered the applicable law on self-defence to be 
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sufficiently broad and flexible to accommodate the experience of 
women in abusive relationships, as it focuses on the accused’s 
perception of circumstances in assessing the reasonableness of the use 
of force. Furthermore, unlike Queensland, Tasmania is a jurisdiction 
with discretionary sentencing for murder.182 
3. England & Wales 
In 2004, the Law Commission (England & Wales) published a 
report on partial defences to murder. The Consultation Paper that 
preceded the Commission’s report stated that special rules relating to 
domestic killings may only be justified if there is medical or other 
evidence which demonstrates a need and a proper basis on which to 
ground such rules.183 The report revealed that not all judges provided 
directions to juries about the need to carefully consider the disparity 
of strength and vulnerability between the defendant and the 
offender.184 The Commission invited the Judicial Studies Board to 
consider providing a specimen direction for trial judges that would 
direct juries to consider the relationship between the defendant and 
the other party in the assessment of reasonableness and the elevated 
view of danger that a defendant who experiences previous violence in 
a relationship may have.185 This came as a response to criticism of the 
law of self-defence, which reposed on two arguments: first that the 
requirement of reasonableness operated in an unreasonable way, if 
conceived objectively. The assessment of reasonableness takes into 
account the proportionality of the attack and defence and 
accommodates only cases in which adversaries are of comparable 
strength.186 Second, cases in which abused persons kill their abusers 
when they are asleep or otherwise defenceless fail to satisfy the 
imminence requirement.187 In the absence of a partial defence188 of 
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excessive self-defence, the Commission concluded that the partial 
defence of provocation (acting out of genuine fear), as recommended, 
would be available.189 The partial defence recommended by the 
Commission introduced an objective test based on a person of 
ordinary tolerance and self-restraint, and combined it with a partially 
subjective requirement of two emotions, namely fear of serious 
violence and anger. The Commission considered this to represent a 
principled approach.190 
The UK is currently in the process of adopting a Domestic 
Abuse Bill.191 The Joint Committee on the Draft Domestic Abuse Bill 
suggested to the Government that a new clause be added to the Bill to 
create a statutory defence for women whose offending is driven by 
their experience of domestic abuse. The Government responded that it 
has not yet been persuaded that the creation of a new defence 
represented a practical or proportionate response in all circumstances 
but agreed to give the proposal a further consideration in view of 
recent development on the case law in the area.192 
4. Ireland 
In 2009, the Law Reform Commission (LRC) of Ireland 
published a report on defences in criminal law, in which it extensively 
commented on the law of self-defence. One part of this discussion, 
which concerned threshold requirements for self-defence – that is, 
whether a minimum level of threat to a person should be required to 
justify lethal defensive force – was dedicated to the issue of 
imminence. As the LRC noted, “the rule [of imminence] has come 
under considerable attack in recent years from those who feel that it 
places undue emphasis on the time measurement between harm and 
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defensive response at the expense of the underlying principle of 
necessity,” especially in cases of killings in domestic violence. 193 The 
LRC outlined three options for law reform: (i) a Presidential pardon, 
(ii) a broadening of the imminence requirement that would either 
include a presumption that the threat of harm faced by a woman is 
always imminent or would result in a different understanding of the 
concept of imminence such as one partially encompassing the concept 
of inevitability, and (iii) abandoning the concept of imminence as a 
threshold requirement.194 
The LRC recommended retaining the imminence requirement, 
but that in assessing imminence, the jury or the court may take account 
of the circumstances as the accused reasonably believed them to be. As 
regards the defence of provocation, the LRC cited a number of authors 
in support of the contention that the defence is gender biased.195 The 
LRC conceded that the defence needed to be reformed in a way that 
diluted the requirement of immediacy, that is, sudden and temporary 
loss of control, and that allowed for greater flexibility in dealing with 
cases of homicides.196 It recommended the introduction of a 
remodelled defence that would combine a subjective and an objective 
test. For the LRC, it was, however, clear that the requirements of 
provocation “are firmly based on male norms and male emotions.”197 
Although the jurisdiction seemed to recognise cumulative provocation 
in the context of domestic violence, the concept of sudden and 
temporary loss of control appeared troublesome for women living 
with domestic violence.198 The LRC proposed that the immediacy 
requirement should not be abolished, but that legislation should 
provide for situations where the defence will not be negated if the act 
causing death did not occur immediately after provocation.199 
However, the presence or absence of an immediate act represents a 
relevant consideration that, in conjunction with other evidence may 
 
193 L. REFORM COMM’N IRELAND, DEFENCES IN CRIMINAL LAW ¶ 2.100 (LRC 95-2009, 
2009). 
194 Id. at ¶¶ 2.113-2.118. 
195 Id. at ¶¶ 4.26-4.28. 
196 Id. at ¶ 4.30. 
197 Id. at ¶ 4.128. 
198 Id. at ¶¶ 4.28-4.31. 
199 Id. at ¶¶ 4.162. 
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decide the question of lost self-control.200 The LRC’s recommendations 
have thus far not been implemented. 
5. Discussion 
In summary, all of the reports examined grounded the need for 
reform in the context of the “deserving claims” of female defendants 
and the “failure to equally” or “properly accommodate” women’s 
experience in criminal justice systems. In the specific context of 
common law jury trials, the assessment of the on-the-ground situation 
revealed problems with juries’ appraisals of facts that contain 
“persisting misconceptions,” are not adequately observant of “social 
context,” circumstances of the accused or “differences between men 
and women.” This evokes similar criticism of police work by the 
ECtHR. The problem is therefore one of evidence evaluation. In the 
reports analysed, the unfairness in the process of fact-finding is 
examined in relation to the concept of reasonableness that is criticised 
if conceived objectively as far as imminence and proportionality are 
concerned. To this, two responses emerged. The first line of response 
refused to reform the traditional defences and considered them flexible 
enough to accommodate women’s perceptions. This line of response 
therefore shifted the focus on how the evidence is admitted and 
assessed in courtrooms. The second response introduced certain 
changes in the substantive concept of the respective defences — 
mingling subjective and objective elements of reasonableness — and 
accompanied them with corresponding evidentiary rules (jury 
directions) that would assist in the reasonableness assessment. 
From the reports analysed, it becomes clear that evidence rules 
may have a significant impact on the operation of defences.201 Some of 
the reports compiled by law reform bodies included a whole chapter 
dedicated to evidence of relationships and domestic violence. The 
VLRC recommended that some clarification should be provided 
 
200 Id. 
201 See also AUSTRALIAN L. REFORM COMM’N, FAMILY VIOLENCE – A NATIONAL 
LEGAL RESPONSE, REPORT NO. 114 ¶ 14.13 (2010) [hereinafter ALRC], https://www.
alrc.gov.au/publication/family-violence-a-national-legal-response-alrc-report-
114/14-homicide-defences-and-family-relationships-in-criminal-laws-2/recognising-
family-violence-in-homicide-defences/ (last visited 14 October 2019). 
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concerning what evidence may be relevant where there is a history of 
prior violence to support a defence of self-defence or duress.202 It 
recalled that so-called relationship evidence may assist the jury in 
assessing the state of the relationship between the pair or the state of 
mind of the offender and the victim. Such evidence plays a role in 
establishing mens rea. It helps to consider the accused’s actions in a 
broader context that informs on the reasonableness of the actions in 
light of the nature of the threat the accused faced, available options to 
escape the violence, and the proportionality of the actions.203 Since 
2015, there is a provision under Part 6 of the Jury Directions Act 2015 
(Vic) for a specific jury direction to be given at the start of the trial 
where self-defence or duress are raised in the context of family 
violence.204 Also, Sections 322J and 33M of the Crimes Act 1958 
(Victoria) allow for social framework evidence to be adduced, which 
explains the nature and dynamics of family violence, and social, 
cultural, or economic factors that impact upon the person affected by 
domestic violence. The VLRC also had regard to a person’s cultural 
background and social support structures,205 which were deemed to 
have a critical impact on the reasonableness assessment. In order to 
ensure that the evidence is properly understood by jurors, expert 
evidence on family violence is recommended. This may include both 
general expert evidence, about the nature and effects of family 
violence, and also case-specific expert evidence that would place the 
situation of the accused and his/her reactions into the framework of 
current knowledge about family violence.206 
In Tasmania, the Law Reform Institute recommended to 
amend the Evidence Act 2001 (Tasmania) to include provisions based 
on the Crimes Act 1958 that provide for a range of domestic violence 
evidence to be admitted and to relate to the subjective and objective 
components of Section 46 of the Criminal Code (Tasmania) on self-
 
202 VLRC, supra note 166, at 132-42. 
203 Id. at 137, ¶4.21. 
204 The provisions were initially introduced into the Jury Directions Act 2013 (Vic) by 
the Crimes Amendment (Abolition of Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (Vic). On 29 June 
2015, the provisions were revised and included in the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Vic). 
205 Specific groups of women such as women from rural areas, women with 
disabilities, and people in same-sex relationships must be also considered. VLRC, 
supra note 166, ¶ 4.24. 
206 Id. at ¶ 4.32. 
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defence. Despite the Institute’s view that the scope of the Evidence Act 
2001 (Tasmania) was sufficient for evidence of domestic violence to be 
admitted, setting out the admissibility and relevance of case-specific 
as well as general evidence about the dynamics of domestic violence 
to self-defence was considered to have an important declaratory 
function.207 The Institute was further of the view that such provision 
would serve an educative function for the legal profession. More 
importantly, the Institute subscribed to Bradfield’s opinion that 
“expert evidence can tie together the varying accounts of witnesses by 
providing an overarching conceptual framework of domestic violence 
within which the individual incidents of violence can be positioned 
and understood.”208 Further, the Institute suggested that the approach 
based on the Victorian model of the Jury Directions Act 2015 (Victoria) 
should be reproduced in Tasmania. Similar recommendations were 
made by the Western Australian Law Reform Commission. The 
Victorian model was also endorsed by the Australian Law Reform 
Commission and the New South Wales Law Reform Commission in 
the joint review of national legal responses to domestic violence. 
Queensland is the only other Australian jurisdiction that has a 
provision addressing the admissibility of evidence of family 
violence.209 In Queensland, the amendment brought to the Criminal 
Code and the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld)210 after the QLRC’s 
deliberations, has explicitly provided for the relevance of the full 
circumstances of the relationship between the accused and the 
deceased in assessing a new partial defence to murder of killing in an 
abusive domestic relationship.211 According to the amendment, a 
history of acts of serious violence may include acts that appear minor 
or trivial when considered in isolation.212 In addition, in assessing the 
reasonableness of the accused’s belief that his or her actions were 
necessary for self-preservation, regard may be had to circumstances 
 
207 TLRI, supra note 177, at ¶ 5.4.7. 
208 Id. (citing Rebecca Bradfield, Understanding the Battered Woman Who Kills her 
Violent Partner — The Admissibility of Expert Evidence of Domestic Violence in 
Australia, 9 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCH. & LAW 177, 193 (2002)). 
209 Id. at ¶ 5.4.3. 
210 Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 132B (Austl.). 
211 See Criminal Code (Abusive Domestic Relationship Defence and Another Matter) 
Amendment Act 2010 (Qld) (Austl.). 
212 Id. at s 304B(4). 
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including acts of the deceased that were not acts of domestic 
violence.213 
In New Zealand, evidence of battered woman syndrome is 
primarily used to correct juror misconceptions about family violence 
and its effects on victims and is now regularly employed in criminal 
trials.214 A number of domestic cases underlined the importance of 
expert evidence to explain the effects of battered woman syndrome 
and to claim self-defence. In its 2001 Report, the Law Commission 
recommended that instead of making reference to the term “battered 
woman syndrome,” the nature and dynamics of the battering 
relationship and the effects of battering should be used in this 
context.215 The Law Commission also noted that certain legal concepts 
such as imminence and proportionality exclude the wider context, 
including the cumulative and compounding nature of family violence 
and the history of the relationship between the offender and the 
deceased.216 The Law Commission recommended to amend the 
Evidence Act 2006 to provide for a broad range of family violence 
evidence to be admitted in support of claims of self-defence and to 
make it clear that evidence may be relevant to both the subjective and 
objective elements under the relevant provisions.217 
One may observe a number of parallels between GREVIO’s 
evaluations of Parties’ compliance with the Convention, as explained 
in the preceding part, and the recommendations of the various law 
reform commissions. In both clusters of sources, the focus is placed on 
the understanding of the specificities of the context, nature and cycle 
of domestic violence. The difference is that law reform commissions 
draw specific implications of considering relationship-social 
framework-case specific and general-expert-full circumstances 
evidence on the assessment of reasonableness or other elements of 
defences in tyrannicide cases. Will it be possible to infer similar 
implications for substantive laws of Parties to the Convention based 
on the Convention’s evidentiary requirements? 
 
213 See Rebecca Campbell, Domestic Relationship Evidence in Queensland: An 
Analysis of a Misunderstood Provision, 42 UNIV. OF N.S.W L. J. 2, 430 (2019). 
214 New Zealand Law Commission, supra note 157, at ¶ 6.69. 
215 Id. at ¶ 6.76. 
216 Id. at ¶ 6.85. 
217 Id. at ¶ 7.87; see id. at 9. 
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EVIDENCE AS A PATTERN CHANGER 
The above analysis illustrates that there are a number of 
possible considerations in searching for the gendered effect of the 
Convention’s evidentiary requirements concerning domestic criminal 
laws, even in situations in which there is no explicit provision dealing 
with self-defence or other defences to criminal responsibility of victims 
of domestic violence in the text of the Convention itself.218 Instead of 
first considering a policy question of gender “fairness” in the operation 
of laws of defences or of the integrated approach to victims of violence 
against women219 (a broad analytical question), one may begin by 
looking at where the obligation to consider certain types of evidence 
may manifest itself in domestic criminal laws (a narrow analytical 
question). What follows is essentially a summary of all possible 
relationships between evidence-substance-procedure, produced on 
the basis of an analysis of the law reform commissions’ reports 
discussed above. 
The first consideration is based on a hypothesis that domestic 
laws on self-defence (or other defences)220 of States Parties are gender 
biased as they stand. It accepts that the laws were modelled on male 
behaviour in confrontational situations, and do not encompass 
women’s killing of abusive partners. For example, they require the 
defence to show that the threat that was averted by the act of self-
defence was imminent or proportional in an objective sense. Therefore, 
even very broad and general evidentiary rules, prescribing that 
evidence can be anything that can help clarify a case and can be freely 
evaluated may not accommodate situations of killings by persons who 
 
218 See AYA GRUBER, THE DUTY TO RETREAT IN SELF-DEFENSE LAW AND VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN, OxfordHandbooks Online (July 2017) https://www.oxford
handbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935352.001.0001/oxfordhb-978019
9935352-e-5 (specifically as regards the evidentiary strategy of introducing expert 
evidence). 
219 As illustrated by the considerations of the Tasmanian Law Reform Institute. See 
TLRI, supra note 177. 
220 It is, however, also interesting to consider that the defence of provocation is 
regarded as a defence that traditionally protects men’s honour. According to Article 
42 of the Convention, ‘honour’ shall not be regarded as justification for acts of 
violence covered by the scope of Convention. In other words, the compatibility of the 
defence of provocation and the Convention may be put into question. 
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have been abused in intimate relationships over a long period. 221 This 
means that even new scientific evidence and research that attempts to 
better understand and explain killings in abusive relationships or 
evidence gathered in individual cases would not “fit” the law of self-
defence and enable the abused defendant to benefit from such a 
defence. As such, the law and the resulting practice may be deemed 
unsuitable from the perspective of the Convention’s requirements. 
The second consideration is based on a hypothesis that 
domestic laws on self-defence (or other defences) can theoretically 
encompass the experiences of women who were abused in intimate 
relationships and killed their partners; however, the practice excludes 
such women from benefiting from these laws. This may be due to very 
strict domestic evidentiary practice that renders evidence of social, 
cultural, psychological, or economic contexts inadmissible or treats 
evidence of physical violence as essential.222 The question is then how 
the evidentiary requirements under the Convention may change the 
unsuitable practice that may be considered gender biased. A focus on 
the doctrinal content of laws of defences could be accompanied by 
appropriate legal professional education on evidentiary issues under 
the Convention or express guidance about the potential relevance of 
domestic violence evidence in the context of homicides committed by 
abused persons.223 This is also obvious from GREVIO’s monitoring 
output, in which it encouraged training of law enforcement agencies 
as to how to handle cases of violence against women, on the basis of a 
model strongly anchored to a gendered understanding of violence.224 
Although recognising that the primary purpose of the 
evidentiary rules under the Convention is to secure vital evidence,225 
decreases in the level of attrition rates, and enhance conviction rates in 
the prosecution of domestic violence and other forms of violence 
 
221 Michael Wutz, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction in Cases of Domestic Violence: 
A comparative analysis of Scottish and German Criminal Procedure, 76 ABERDEEN 
STUDENT L. REV. 2, 76 (2011). 
222 Gasimova, supra note 103. 
223 Cf. ALRC, supra note 201. 
224 GREVIO — Report Italy, supra note 96. 
225 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EXPLANATORY REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE ON 
PREVENTING AND COMBATING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ¶ 
255 (Council of Europe Treaty Series – No. 210, 2011), https://rm.coe.int/16800d383
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against women and to establish protection measures;226 the third 
question to be explored is for what purpose the contextual evidence 
under the Convention should be considered in cases of women’s 
killings of abusive partners.227 Evidence plays a role in each aspect of 
a criminal case: from the investigation, to establishing the motive of 
the offender, to sentencing. It can affect criminal responsibility (self-
defence), the classification of offences (murder versus manslaughter), 
guilt (intentional versus unintentional killing), and/or sentencing 
(mitigating circumstances). Since the evidentiary requirements and the 
gendered understanding of violence are included under the chapter on 
investigation, prosecution, procedural law, and protective measures, 
it can be suggested that evidence in domestic violence cases should 
play a more prominent role in legal appraisals of the relevant facts than 
at the sentencing stage. The contextual evidence under the Convention 
may potentially lead to diminishing or excluding the criminal 
responsibility of women killing their abusive partners. It is unclear, 
however, what result from the perspective of substantive criminal law 
provisions will be deemed sufficient under the Convention. This also 
means that evidentiary rules cannot secure a completely unified 
application of substantive laws. 
In light of the potential variability at the general theoretical 
level, we endeavoured to demonstrate the variable effects of the 
Convention’s evidentiary requirements in two jurisdictions, namely 
France and Germany. These represent two of the largest European 
jurisdictions that are Parties to the Convention. They are also two 
jurisdictions operating the classic European continental inquisitorial 
system of criminal justice,228 and both have also recently considered 
criminal law reform regarding the criminal responsibility of women 
killing their domestic abusers.229 Unlike common law jurisdictions, 
 
226 GREVIO — Report Finland, supra note 98. 
227 Evidentiary rules should be considered for legal appraisals of aggravating 
circumstances since they are explicitly provided for in Article 46 of the Convention. 
228 See John Spencer, Adversarial vs Inquisitorial Systems: Is There Still Such a 
Difference?, 20 INT’L J. OF HUM. RTS. 601, 601-616 (2016). 
229 In France, INSPECTION GÉNÉRALE DE LA JUSTICE, MISSION SUR LES HOMICIDES 
CONJUGAUX 1-36 (2019); COMMISSION NATIONALE CONSULTATIVE DES DROITS DE 
L’HOMME, AVIS SUR LES VIOLENCES CONTRE LES FEMMES ET LES FÉMINICIDE 1-25 
(2016). In Germany, BUNDESMINISTER DER JUSTIZ, ABSCHLUSSBERICHT DER 
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both countries employ the free evaluation of evidence principle in 
criminal cases (libre appréciation).230 Generally, courts in both France 
and Germany have the responsibility for determining facts, and 
should accept evidence of all facts that are necessary for reaching a 
decision.231 Neither Germany nor France, has any code containing a 
systematic set of rules of evidence, akin to the common law model. It 
is therefore not possible to reform evidentiary rules in a fashion similar 
to New Zealand, Queensland, or Tasmania as seen above. It may, 
however, be possible to flexibly change the evidentiary practice of 
courts, for example, by regularly summoning experts on domestic 
violence to tyrannicide cases. This is also one of the limitations of the 
fact-finding process in Germany and France: judges cannot consider 
social framework, psychological, or other scientific evidence on their 
own, but such evidence must be always channelled into the criminal 
justice process via an expert testimony.232 It is the judge who selects 
the experts to be consulted in criminal cases.233 
1. German law 
Depending on the particular case, evidence endorsed by the 
Convention may be used in diminishing the criminal responsibility of 
a woman who kills her abusive husband, either from the aggravated 
form of murder, to the basic offence, or to a killing of still lesser gravity. 
This may be done in a number of ways. For example, the 
German Strafgesetzbuch recognises murder under aggravating 
circumstances (Mord), ordinary murder (Totschlag), and murder under 
 
EXPERTENGRUPPE ZUR REFORM DER TÖTUNGSDELIKTE (§§ 211 – 213, 57a StGB) 1-
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COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON EVIDENTIARY RULES 72 (Sabine Gless & Thomas 
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mitigating circumstances (minder schwerer Fall des Totschlag).234 Murder 
under aggravating circumstances is defined by the motive or means by 
which it is perpetrated or by the fact that it is committed to cover up 
another offence. It, inter alia, encompasses the killing for pleasure, 
sexual gratification, out of greed, or otherwise “base motives.”235 It 
does not necessarily punish premeditation. However, importantly 
from the perspective of abused women, it also encompasses murder 
committed by stealth, in an insidious (perfidious; heimtückisch) manner 
that exploits the fact that the victim is not expecting the attack, for 
example because he is asleep.236 As such, it has been suggested that the 
current version of §211 Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) disadvantages 
physically weaker persons, such as women, who defend themselves 
by taking advantage of an opportunity to engage in an unexpected 
attack.237 This is reminiscent of similar considerations made by the 
Law Commission of England and Wales, as well as the reports from 
Ireland and New Zealand concerning the operation of the imminence 
requirement. It has been suggested that the requirement of 
insidiousness results from a legal-policy need, but it is considered too 
wide as it undesirably covers some women’s killings 
(Haustyrranmordfälle) and at the same time, too narrow, as it excludes 
infants and unconscious people.238 Moreover, it is not unusual for any 
perpetrator to exploit the weaknesses of his or her victim. As such, to 
regard the “honourable duel” as a normal, standard case is 
mistaken.239 In 2015, a group of experts established under the auspices 
of the Federal Ministry of Justice considered a reform of homicide 
 
234 STRAFGESTZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE] § 211, https://dejure.org/gesetze/StGB/
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offences under § 211-213 StGB. A part of this group advocated to 
remove “insidiousness” as a characteristic of the aggravated form of 
murder.240 The reason was that the socio-legal disapproval of insidious 
murders had been the same as in “normal” killings, and there had been 
no compelling reason to privilege an aggressive approach over a 
cunning one.241 The expert group also admitted that 
Haustyrranmordfälle show a conspicuous proximity to self-defence or 
necessity, so that qualification of murder is hardly justified. This led 
the experts to consider the supplementation of the “insidiousness” 
characteristics with the “exploitation of defencelessness existing for 
other reasons” (Ausnutzung einer aus anderen Gründen bestehenden 
Schutzlosigkeit).242 
Under § 213 StGB, murder under mitigating circumstances is 
an intentional murder provoked by rage resulting from maltreatment 
or serious insult made by the victim and immediate loss of self-
control.243 Application of this provision would diminish the sentence 
from that attached to “ordinary” murder.244 This may evoke the partial 
defence of provocation that diminished the criminal responsibility 
from murder to manslaughter as considered in the common law 
jurisdictions discussed above. Theoretically, a woman killing her 
husband may be charged with murder under mitigating circumstances 
that carries a lower sentence, and her sentence may be further 
diminished by another set of facts to a suspended sentence.245 
However, where such mitigating circumstances are not provided, and 
charging that woman under the aggravated form of murder would 
produce a prima facie injustice, it seems that it is possible under German 
law to resort to the so-called legal consequence solution 
(Rechtsfolgenlösung).246 A Regional Court, for example, has mitigated 
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the woman’s sentence for “extraordinary circumstances” in just such a 
case.247 
Depending on the particular case, evidence endorsed by the 
Convention may also be used in excluding the criminal responsibility 
of a woman killing her abusive husband, for example under conditions 
specified for self-defence and necessity. In principle, self-defence 
(Notwehr) and necessity (Notstand) would be available to abused 
women in German law.248 As in common law jurisdictions, the 
problem is that both defences require an imminent attack 
(threat/danger) to be averted.249 In principle, self-defence 
presupposes necessity – the defensive action is the only and the least 
intrusive means to terminate an unlawful attack.250 Necessity, on the 
other hand, presupposes proportional means of averting the danger.251 
Moreover, both defences employ certain proportionality limitations 
(Gebotenheit/Abwägung der widerstreitenden Interessen),252 which may be 
further strengthened in light of particular social-ethical norms such as 
a special relationship between the victim and the defendant, including 
husband and wife.253 Earlier case-law of the Federal Court of Germany 
(Bundesgerichtshof) required spouses under certain circumstances to 
refrain from methods of defence that would prove reliable but fatal, 
even where less fatal methods would be less effective.254 The 
Bundesgerichtshof no longer requires spouses to suffer at least minor 
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injuries before employing more serious means of protection.255 
However, it is generally expected that a woman should make certain 
sacrifices, such as calling the police first, leaving her home, and going 
to a women’s shelter, unless this cannot be reasonably expected 
because she has children who cannot be left behind, she has financial 
problems, or she is at higher risk of social stigmatisation.256 In certain 
circumstances, it can be legitimately expected that she undergoes a 
certain danger (in case of the defence of necessity).257 In a landmark 
case, the Bundesgerichstshof required the defendant to retreat before 
striking in self-defence, which is noteworthy because the defendant 
aggravated the situation by displaying a knife that further provoked 
her abusive husband.258 On the other hand, with respect to women in 
abusive relationships, it cannot be legitimately expected to “litigate a 
divorce or the institutionalisation of a cruel and violent husband if 
during the proceedings the violence would continue.”259 
Under German law, the defence of excessive self-defence 
(Überschreitung der Notwehr) is made available to persons who exceed 
the reasonable limits of self-defence in confusion, fear, or terror.260 The 
purpose of this defence is to exonerate a psychologically stressed 
(asthenic) state of mind that seriously impacted the defendant’s self-
control.261 Scientific evidence would be crucial to make the defence 
successful. The defence is, however, only available where the 
defendant went beyond the necessity requirement or violated the 
socio-ethical restrictions of the defence.262 The concept of excessive 
self-defence under German law contrasts with that of excessive self-
defence in common law, which has a status of partial defence, merely 
reducing the charge from murder to manslaughter,263 and with the 
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offence of defensive homicide as legislated for in the Crimes 
(Homicide) Act 2005 on the basis of the VLRC’s recommendations.264 
The concept of excessive self-defence under German law may seem 
akin to the construction of self-defence upon a combination of 
subjective and objective elements necessary for its assessment, an 
approach suggested by the LRC of Ireland and by the Law 
Commission of England and Wales. 
It is also possible that an abused woman was mistaken about 
the ambit of permissible actions under self-defence. This may be 
considered as putative self-defence, and must be assessed in the 
context of the severity of the abuse suffered and the time for 
consideration of these actions.265 In this context, it is important to note, 
that the Bundesgerichstshof in the Haustyrranmordfall considered each 
action undertaken by the abused woman separately and not in a 
broader context, as the Convention would require.266 Commentators 
note that this can be explained by a lack of expert opinion on the 
situation regarding battered women.267 Putative self-defence may 
potentially lead to avoiding criminal responsibility for intentional 
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offences, while responsibility for negligent manslaughter is 
preserved.268 
2. French law 
Similar to German law, the French Code pénal differentiates the 
basic offence of homicide and aggravated forms of homicide.269 The 
substantive construction is, however much more simplistic. There is 
no mitigated offence of homicide. The basic offence of homicide 
requires intention.270 An aggravated form is constructed so as to 
include actions that have a certain relationship to another criminal 
offence, actions that are premeditated (assasinat), or actions that are 
directed against certain specified victims.271 An aggravated form of 
murder also includes an act committed by the victim’s spouse or 
partner.272 Although the intention of the legislator was to become 
tougher on violence committed against women, it is possible that a 
battered woman killing her abuser would be covered by the same 
provision.273 Since France abolished minimum penalties in 1994, 
homicide in the basic or aggravated form is no longer mandatorily 
punishable by imprisonment.274 However, in France, a mandatory 
safety period for aggravated homicide prevents the individualisation 
of sentences to a certain degree, namely probationary release.275 Also, 
in 2010, an amendment to Article 132-80 of the Code pénal was 
introduced, which increased the sanctions when a crime was 
committed by the (former) spouse or partner.276 
French law, just like German law, recognises several defences 
to criminal responsibility, with the exception of the Überschreitung der 
Notwehr, which does not find an analogy in the Code pénal. Under the 
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defence of duress in French law (contrainte), a person is not criminally 
responsible when acting under the influence of a force or a constraint 
which he or she could not withstand.277 Such could possibly 
encompass fears of specific reprisals from the abusive husband 
(external psychological constraint).278 In common law systems, this 
would correspond to a defence of necessity (duress of 
circumstances).279 Consequently, the provision of duress could be 
favourable to victims of domestic violence, placed under the influence 
of conjugal terror in a situation of psychological subjugation and 
extreme dependence, thereby rendering it dangerous to break the 
spiral of domination.280 This construct has, however, never been tested 
in the case-law of French courts.281 It has been recently proposed by 
the National Consultation Commission on Human Rights that duress 
be more commonly accepted by French courts as a defence in the 
context of domestic violence.282 
It is also possible to consider the defence of necessity, requiring 
satisfaction of the requirements of imminence and proportionality.283 
Similar to German law, the danger that is being averted must have 
truly necessitated the defence. If the offender could have resorted to 
other means of safeguarding her interests, she could not avail of the 
defence, “unless this was the best course of action.”284 A lawful use of 
self-defence (légitime défense) requires an unlawful attack; however, an 
attack on peoples’ morals is also sufficient.285 Comparable to German 
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law, self-defence requires proportionate responses to present or 
imminent attacks, i.e. no time lapse is permitted between the attack 
and the response.286 These requirements also recently came under 
review by the National Consultation Commission on Human Rights, 
which recommended that self-defence be modified by integrating 
elements of individualised assessments such as size, age, sex, previous 
relationship, or physical capacities of the parties involved.287 In 
addition, a recent amendment of the French Code pénal proposed to 
create a separate complete defence to criminal responsibility if the 
offender experiences psychic or neuropsychic impairment due to 
repeated domestic violence that alters her discernment or affects her 
control over her actions.288 In this way, it is possible to recognise 
domestic violence as an atypical situation, a product of which is 
extraordinary psychology that tears apart learned patterns of 
behaviour.289 
3. Discussion 
The above presents an outline of possible venues where the 
types of evidence endorsed by the Convention (e.g. concerning the 
proper understanding of the nature and cycle of domestic violence, of 
its dynamics, and how myths and stereotypes around victims’ 
behaviour may be dispelled) may be subsumed or channelled into. A 
number of key points emerge. 
First, France and Germany have both considered certain 
reforms to their criminal laws that would better accommodate the 
situations of women killing their domestic abusers. 
Second, both jurisdictions include laws governing self-
defence, applying similar elements for its assessment. It is likely that 
without substantive changes to the concept of self-defence, 
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comparable to those suggested in France, evidence endorsed by the 
Convention may be difficult to adduce during legal assessments in 
court. 
Third, the respective classifications and elements of homicide 
offences in France and Germany are fundamentally different. In any 
jurisdiction, where such differentiation exists, evidence considered 
under the Convention could potentially be used to avoid the gravest 
homicide charge or even to make a legal appraisal of the factual 
situation to the benefit of the mitigated form of homicide. In this way, 
Germany offers a more varied selection of potential application of the 
evidence. 
Fourth, in Germany, it would be certainly possible to consider 
social framework evidence that helps to better understand the 
circumstances of battered defendants under the so-called 
Rechtsfolgenlösung. 
Fifth, social framework evidence could also play a role in the 
context of assessing the German concept of putative self-defence. Some 
of the observed practices have clearly been non-compliant with the 
Convention, such as the non-contextual assessment of battered 
women’s situations in claims of putative self-defence by German 
courts. 
Sixth, in Germany, on the basis of the evidence endorsed by 
the Convention, it could be equally possible to downplay certain 
requirements concerning the level of danger and attacks a female 
defendant needs to demonstrate in order to successfully plead 
necessity or self-defence. 
Seventh, in both jurisdictions, there is a risk that relevant facts 
will be subsumed under certain legal categories in which the context 
of any history of a domestic violence relationship is irrelevant, for 
example insidiousness in German law or whether the victim of the 
homicide was the defendant’s husband in French law. Such categories 
may automatically aggravate the criminal responsibility of the 
defendant. If the relevant facts are shown, the legal assessment is 
inescapable. For that reason, a reform of such, seemingly gender-
neutral and potentially gender-biased, legal categories were proposed 
by the expert bodies. 
Eighth, it should be noted that there are also other legal 
categories that provide a space for contextual (social framework) 
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evidence. Examples include the mitigated form of murder (§ 213 StGB) 
or excessive self-defence (§ 33 StGB). 
Ninth, and final, French criminal law is more compact and 
integrated, and therefore creates fewer apertures for contextual 
evidence to slip through. The defence of duress could provide such an 
opportunity (Article 122–2 Code pénal). However, for now, it may seem 
more promising for contextual evidence to wait for the new defence, 
applicable in cases of repeated domestic violence, to be legislated for. 
The above demonstrates that evidence and substantive legal 
rules interact on at least four levels: first, during the investigation 
phase, the police and the prosecutor must gather evidence and identify 
all of the relevant circumstances that relate to the criminal offence. 
After the establishment of the factual side of the case, one may proceed 
with the legal appraisal of the relevant facts. Second, elements of legal 
rules may require certain types of proof, such as the proof of 
imminence; therefore, certain facts must be “found” to satisfy the legal 
definition. Third, legal rules may be crafted in a bottom-up process, in 
which a rule is formulated based on individual cases (such as pub 
brawls involving men of equal size presented the initial model for the 
contemporary rule on self-defence). Fourth, legal rules may be crafted 
in a top-down process, in which a legal norm is created on the basis of 
scientific evidence of social or other phenomena, such as clinical 
psychological, medical, criminological, or social framework evidence 
that would relax the imminence requirement.290 However, the 
emphasis on doctrinal coherence may present challenges to such an 
evidence-law interaction.291 New legal rules may then require a change 
in evidentiary rules on their own motion, such as expanding the 
admissibility rules that would allow for the inclusion of evidence of 
history of violence, contextual evidence, and other types of evidence. 
Counter-clockwise, evidentiary rules and practice, as required by 
international treaties, may be capable of provoking a change in a 
(substantive) legal rule, such as that governing self-defence. 
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CONCLUSION 
International law no longer consists exclusively of a system in 
which the interests protected are vastly different to those protected at 
national level. However, international society is not one that lends 
itself to coherent, homogenous and stable propositions.292 In the field 
of women’s rights, the Istanbul Convention is a leading example of the 
problems that may arise in the context of a one-size-fits-all model, even 
on a regional level. Evidentiary requirements under the Convention 
that reflect the latest social science research represent a unique driver 
of change. In the case of the Convention, such scientific evidence 
derived from the research is presumed to seep deep into domestic laws 
and individual cases. However, problems arise when evidence 
endorsed by the Convention can be subsumed under several domestic 
legal concepts simultaneously. Problems also arise when there is no 
general or residual category under which evidence may be considered 
and found legally relevant. Furthermore, even if the Convention sees 
charging a woman acting against her abuser as secondary 
victimisation, there is a long way to travel from the legal classification 
of such an act as intentional killing, to killing under mitigating 
circumstances, to unintentional killing and ultimately to avoiding 
criminal responsibility based on the evidence presented, as implicitly 
envisaged by the Convention. 
However, the latest social science, medical, and other research 
drives compliance and reform. In criminal law, it justified reforms to 
self-defence, including the removal of the imminence requirement or 
changes to the defence of provocation. In certain cases, it also 
necessitated express provisions for the leading evidence about 
domestic violence that was often misunderstood. The question 
therefore remains in which direction the evidentiary requirements 
under the Convention, which include evidence with significant 
consequences when admitted at trial, actually point.293 Do they point 
in the direction of the exclusion of criminal responsibility of women 
who kill their abusers in extreme cases? Such a question is open to 
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domestic debates by individual Parties to the Convention. The 
evidentiary requirements under the Convention may be capable of 
fostering a discussion about the gendered operation of self-defence in 
the domestic law of Parties or may invite domestic judicial actors to 
reflect upon the gender-neutral applicability of legal categories that 
mitigate criminal responsibility. Next, sentencing considerations may 
open. Notably, the Australian examples may offer indications as to 
what form such deliberations can take. 
The authors of this article believe that such debates should 
include many different aspects of the issue,294 including support 
available to victims of domestic violence, and hence the Parties’ 
compliance with this requirement under the Convention.295 They also 
believe that if the Convention should prescribe the criminalisation of 
certain offences, it must also explicitly provide for exclusion from 
criminal responsibility. “Despite the centrality of concern for battered 
[women] in much contemporary discussion in criminology and the 
criminal law [more broadly], it appears that there is still substantial 
research to be done to clarify [all] circumstances in which [female] 
victims of [domestic] violence kill their abusive partners.”296 
Meanwhile, in Ireland, Italy, or Australia, cases of women who took 
the law into their own hands continue to re-appear and resonate in the 
public sphere.297 
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